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Abstract

CAPGRAS' SYNDROME

by
Robert J. Berson

Advisor:

Professor Harold Wilensky

Capgras* Syndrome, the delusion of doubles, is a rare
delusional phenomenon in which a person believes that
identical doubles have replaced significant people in
his life and/or that there exist identical doubles of
himself.

These delusional doubles are almost always

believed to be malevolent.

The delusion occurs in a

variety of psychotic states, usually schizophrenia.
It occurs in both women and men in a wide age range.
This dissertation reviews early French reports by Capgras
and his associates as well as over 100 cases reported
in English.

Previous efforts to explain the Syndrome

have stressed both organic and psychodynamic factors.
The Syndrome has been observed with many organic con
ditions, but the allegation of doubles is selective,
the problem is not misrecognition but belief, thus
psychodynamic factors must be significant.

Psycho

dynamic explanations have emphasized four major themes:
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Oedipal problems in women, feelings of strangeness,
intolerable ambivalence, and pathological splitting.
An approach to the delusion based on object relations
theory seems most comprehensive, because it is the
manner in which images of self and others are intern
alized that appears to underlie the delusion.

For

Capgras’ Syndrome to develop there must be paranoid
characteristics, a psychotic state, and, I suggest,
severe disturbances in early internalized object
relations.

The case presented here illustrates the

application of an object relations approach to the
history of a 32 year old woman who believed that her
mother, uncle, and cousin (her only living relatives)
had been replaced by doubles and that there were two
doubles of herself.

This woman experienced inadequate

mothering in infancy, became an isolated and aloof
adolescent, and suffered the onset of a schizophrenic
illness in her mid-twenties, just after completion of
medical school.

Capgras' Syndrome is a frightening yet

uncannily familiar phenomenon.

The idea of doubles has

long had a place in human religion and literature, and
to make the Syndrome more conprehensible and thus more
treatable it is appropriate to examine the use of the
idea of doubles in fiction.

It is also useful to build

a continuum from the psychotic delusion of doubles through
the neurotic "family romance" toward a recognition of
similar dynamics in normal life.
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I
Introduction

In early July of 1979 a young woman was admitted to
the psychiatry service of the large urban hospital where
I had begun my interneship in clinical psychology.

She

said that her mother had died earlier that week and that
she had become "despondent" and tried to jump out a window
(she was restrained by a friend) after hearing voices
telling her to join her mother.

She resisted the idea of

hospitalization at first, but with minimal persuasion she
agreed to a voluntary admission.

The woman, Ms. F . , said

she was a single, Jewish woman of 32 who had lived alone
with her mother since her father's death seven years before.
She told us that her parents had been hidden during the
Holocaust, she herself had been born in 1947 in Austria,
and the family had come to the United States in 1949.

She

said she had attended a public high school and city college,
then worked for a credit firm until her father's death,
when her inheritance enabled her to stop working.

Since

then, she said, she had occupied herself by visiting mu
seums, attending concerts, and reading.
siblings and no living relatives.

There were no

"I am used to my
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solitude," she said in response to a question, "and I
feel all will be well— I feel an inner strength.

. .1

have no functional problems, the voices were a transient
aberration; the admission was inappropriate."

She was

dirty and unkempt, her mood depressed and her affect strik
ingly flat.

She was fully oriented, alert, and clearly

well educated.
or cognition.

There were no obvious defects in memory
She was diagnosed as suffering a psychotic

depression and started on a low dose of neuroleptic medi
cation.
For several days she
thetic staff.

repeated her story to a sympa

Then, with no apparent reason, she began to

tell a different story.

She told us that she had graduated

from a local medical school, had during her residency un
willingly become part of a five-year psychoanalytic film
study in which her entire life had been filmed, had sued
for invasion of privacy and had been awarded five huxidrdd
million dollars, but had then been "incarcerated” at a near
by state hospital by the "film director-psychologists" who
wanted the money for themselves.

She had escaped from the

hospital, lived with a man she picked up on the street,
then come to the West Side of Manhattan where she "engaged
in sexual deviancy with several men for the profit of the
film director-psychologists."
We on staff were convinced that the story of filmed
studies and law suits was delusional, but we gradually were
struck by an awareness that we had believed the first story

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3
without obtaining any evidence other than the words of
Ms. F. herself.

When we discovered that she had given a

false address, we realized that there were two "crazy"
stories and that we knew nothing of our patient’s "real"
life.

It was at about that time, a week or so after her

arrival on the ward, that Ms. F. added that the "film
director-psychologists" had put a "double" in her place to
collect the five hundred million dollars and that while
her "real mother" had died long ago, an "imposter mother"
was alive, living in a nursing home, and was a "double" of
her real mother.

It was at this point that we realized

that our patient suffered from the delusion of doubles
first described by Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux in 1923.
In this essay I will attempt to achieve an understand
ing of Capgras’ Syndrome through a review of the litera
ture and a discussion of the patient I treated.

I will

first define the syndrome, review the psychological litera
ture, and present the explanatory hypotheses that have
been suggested.

In discussing the explanatory hypotheses

I will indicate their inadequacies and suggest an explana
tory hypothesis based in object relations theory.

I will

then present the data of the case of Ms. F . , concluding
with an application of the object relations approach to
her illness.

Finally, I will attempt to place Capgras’

Syndrome in a broader context, looking for its roots and
analogues in both normal and neurotic experience and in
fiction as well, and examining the implications of my in
quiry for both further research and effective treatment.
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There are significant limitations to this study.
Capgras’ Syndrome is a relatively rare phenomenon (See
Appendix for a list of cases reported in English language
literature), and I am able to discuss only one case in
detail.

The data for my case are themselves limited, for

my patient was as highly guarded as she was severely ill,
and the external sources of data I eventually encountered
were so deeply distressed by Ms. F. ’s illness that I de
cided not to press them.

The data from the professional

literature are often sparse as well, especially with re
gard to information about the early life experiences of
the patients described. Thus I must construct a hypotheti
cal argument on less than adequate data.

Recognizing

these limits, however, I believe that a heuristic essay
thoroughly examining, as I have done, as much of the liter
ature as possible, can provide the basis for the better
understanding and treatment of patients presenting the
delusion of doubles.
Ms. F. was one of the first patients of my interneship
year.

The tragedies of her history, her illness, and her

death made my experience with her an unforgettable encoun
ter. (See Chapter III.)

It became an absorbing personal

commitment to try to learn about the Syndrome, to uncover
especially the earliest reports, and to struggle with the
explanations offered— explanations at first so convincing,
but then so obviously incomplete.
at least to understand better.

I felt I owed it to her

There is another reason
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as well for this essay.

The tragic waste of life, in

fluenced at least in part by the horror of the Holocaust,
should not be permitted to go untold.

The story should

be spoken.
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II
Capgras' Syndrome

"The Capgras’ Syndrome," write Enoch, Trethowan, and
Barker (1967), "is a rare, colorful syndrome in which the
patient believes that a person, usually closely related to
him, has been replaced by an exact double."(p.1)

The

syndrome is indeed rare— I have been able to discover,
utilizing computer searches as well as texts, only about
124 case reports in the English language literature. (See
Appendix.)

Foreign language sources are harder to unearth,

but I have obtained the first three case reports by Capgras
and his associates as well as French accounts of approxi
mately 25 cases reported from 1923 to 1962.

Citations in

the more recent French papers indicate that the total num
ber of cases in the French literature is also small— I have
located citations indicating approximately 50 reports.
(An indirect indication of the rarity of the syndrome may
be taken from the eagerness with which so colorful a syn
drome is reported: the appearance of the syndrome is so
dramatic that nearly everyone who has had contact with it
seems to write an article; most of the articles

are unim

pressive, offering little more than description, and some
of the articles report cases that fail to meet the descrip
tive diagnostic criteria.

Lansky (1974) comments: "The
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clinical presentation is so striking it is unlikely that
the syndrome occurs frequently and is overlooked-"(p.363)
If so eagerly reported a syndrome has produced so few pub
lished articles, one may, I think, assume its relative
rarity.)
Arieti and Meth offer the following definition and
description of Capgras' Syndrome in the first edition of
The American Handbook of Psychiatry (1959):
The phenomenon (or syndrome) described by Capgras is
the following: the patient will claim, on meeting some
one he knows well, that the person is a double or an
impostor who has assumed this person’s appearance.
For example, the mother of a female patient comes to
visit the patient at the hospital. The patient claims
that this visitor is not the mother but either a double
of her or an impostor who has tried to assume the
appearance of the mother in order to deceive the patient.
The phenomenon is this complicated type of misidentification, much more characteristic and specific than the
usual misidentifications occurr.±®gin schizophrenia.
(Vol. I,p.548)
The descriptions offered both by Enoch, Trethowan and Bar
ker and by Arieti and Meth are incomplete, for the first
patient described by Capgras not only claimed that there
were doubles of significant other people in her life, but
also claimed that there were doubles of herself.(Capgras
and Reboul-Lachaux, 1923)

One reason for this descriptive

incompleteness may lie in Arieti and Meth's use of sources.
Arieti and Meth cite a report in Annales Medico-Psychologiques which is actually a two paragraph summary of a full
ten page report in the Bulletin de la Societe Clinique de
Medicine Mentale.

The summary does not mention the patient’s

belief in doubles of herself; the full paper speaks at length
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about this symptom.

Many other authors whose papers I

have read also cite the summary rather than
port.

the fullre

While most patients claim that there are doubles

of others, some— including the original patient— claim
that there are doubles of themselves as well.

It might

be wise, then, to define the Capgras’ Syndrome as the de
lusional belief in the existence of identical doubles of
others and/or of oneself.
The first report of a patient with this

delusion is the

report of Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux (1923) already men
tioned. (Earlier descriptions of the delusion by Bessiere,
Janet, and Magnan are reported by Todd, Dewhurst, and Wallis,
1981.)

Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux entitled their report

"L'Illusion des 'Sosies' dans une Delire Systematise Chronique” or "The Illusion of Doubles in a Chronic Systematized
Delirium." (Sosie is the French word for double.

It is

derived from the name Sosia; Sosia was the servant of Am
phitryon in Plautus' play Amphitryon, in which Mercury im
personated Sosia.

In Greek mythology impersonations and

transformations are not uncommon.

Indeed, Zeus himself

impersonated Amphitryon in order to sleep with his wife
Alcmena; Alcmena conceived by Zeus her son, Heracles.)
Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux chose to speak of the phenomenon
"after the manner of the patient"(p.12) who herself used
the word "sosie."
The patient was a woman of 53 at the time of the re
port.

She had married at 29 and had one living child,
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a daughter of 20; four other children had died at birth
or in infancy.

Her husband stated that she had been in a

"nervous state” beginning three or four years after their
marriage (she would have been 33 or 34 and had lost two
children); her state became more severe after the deaths of
her twin sons when she was 37.

Her early symptoms included

hearing the moaning of children from under the ground,
which led to a belief that there were hidden caverns beneath
the streets of Paris filled with kidnapped children.
Several years later she told her husband that he was an
impostor, a double.

Little is told of her early history

(a difficulty with most case reports of Capgras’ Syndrome),
save that she had attended school to the age of 14, then
worked as a seamstress.

Her delusions seemed to have been

systematized and fixed from about the age 44 on.

These

delusions consisted of ideas of grandeur (that she was the
kidnapped daughter of aristocrats), ideas of persecution
(her princely fortune was being stolen, people were trying
to poison her), and the belief in doubles.
In addition to believing that her husband had been
replaced by a double, she asserted that three of her dead
children had not died but had been carried away and replaced
by (dead) doubles. (The other child had been poisoned, she
said.)

Furthermore, doubles had replaced her concierge,

her domestic servants, tenants in her building, and so on.
Police officers too had been replaced by impostors (frustra
ting her efforts, she claimed, to bring these matters to
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the attention of the authorities) as well as doctors,
staff, and patients in the hospital.

In addition, she

asserted that "she (herself) had two or three doubles of
which she knew."(p.8)

These doubles of herself were part

of the plot to forge her papers and steal her fortune and
to have her held in captivity.

"How is it possible that

such an illusion be born and develop?" ask Capgras and
Reboul-Lachaux.(p.13)

To answer their question, they argue

persuasively that for this patient a long period of anxiety
and agitation (following the deaths of her children) brought
about her first delusions and hallucinations which in turn
produced a "feeling of strangeness" ("sentiment d 1etrangete.")
The feeling of strangeness did not distort either percep
tion or memory, however, and so well-known and well-remem
bered people were recognized accurately but in association
with a profound and pervasive feeling of strangeness.

In

order to make sense of this, the patient concluded that the
people she saw were impostors.

"The illusion of doubles,

for her, is thus not, to speak correctly, a sensory illusion,
but the conclusion of an affective judgment."(p.14)

Cap

gras and Reboul-Lachaux do not specifically explore the
symptom of belief in doubles of the self except to say that
too fits into the general delusion of persecution as the
patient tried to explain why she was hospitalized and why
she was unable to claim her ancestral inheritance.

Of

significance in their understanding of the formation of
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the delusion was the patient's "paranoid disposition.

. .

very marked inclination to distrust and minute investiga
tion of the slightest details."(p.14)
The second case of the delusion reported in France is
described in a short paper by Halberstadt (1923). "Doctors
Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux have had the merit of recently
calling attention to a new clinical syndrome to which they
have given the name of illusion of doubles."(p.728) writes
Halberstadt.

His patient was a 41 year old woman, married,

with a son of 20.

At 24 she had a hysterectomy, afterward

becoming "neurasthenic," melancholic, and eventually sui
cidal.

Several years later she had developed ideas of

grandeur, bought things at random, and made large gifts of
money.

By her late 30s she was aloof, hostile, and irri

table; she expressed paranoid delusions of people trying
to poison her, spoke at times in neologisms, and suffered
from auditory hallucinations, thought insertion, and thought
broadcasting.

She asserted there were doubles of her hus

band, son, doctor, and nurses.

Halberstadt does not

speak at length about a belief in a double of the self,
but notes that his patient believed that "All the world
has a double, she like the others."(p.729)

Halberstadt

attributes the development of the delusion to "transitivism,"
a state in which the external world appears changed, and
to regression to primitive, pre-logical modes of thought,
in a patient with a paranoid suspiciousness.

Halberstadt,
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however, notes that he offers his observations with reser
vations, as a hypothesis rather than explanation.

"It

is,” he writes, "extremely difficult if not impossible to
'explain' the genesis of all delusions.

The mentality of

the aliene is not in all ways similar to that of the normal
man, his manner of creating and coordinating concepts is
not ours, contradictions and implausabilities do not shock
him." (p. 732)
Capgras reported his second case of the delusion of
doubles in 1924 (Capgras and Carette, 1924).

The patient

was a woman of 33 who had been psychotic for eight to ten
years at least.

This woman had always loved her father

more than her mother; she idealized him and was attentive
to his physical and emotional state.

She willingly broke

off her only emotional attachment to a young man because
her father disapproved.

She hated her mother, however,

for the mother was critical, pointing out her homeliness
and masculine traits.

The patient was from adolescence

on obsessed about her appearance and its effects on others;
at 18 she became withdrawn, seeking solitude in which she
ruminated about the hateful mother who had caused her such
pain; eventually she became irritable and antisocial and
her agitation and threats necessitated hospitalization.
For six years her thoughts concentrated on "tenderness
toward the father, hatred toward the mother."(p.60) Her
feelings toward her father
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constituted the principal concern of the patient,
which she analyzed without cease and of which she spoke
the most abundantly. She acknowledged with the most
naive shamelessness her love for her father. In
periods of calm this love appeared almost filial.
It
expressed itself most often in a melange of sentimen
tal tenderness, of eroticism and of jealousy, ordina
rily placid enough and without a truly passionate charac
ter. But if, upon the influence of a commonplace anno
yance, there occurred a crisis of excitation, immediate
ly the sensuality awakened and Blanche overpowered
with obscene insults the father who did not respond
to her desires and the mother who was her rival, (p.60)
"The exteriorization of the Oedipus complex was entire
ly spontaneous," write Capgras and Carette, "without the
least intervention of psychoanalysis."(p.61)

The general

"psychic enfeeblement" (what we might call weakening of
the ego?) of the psychotic illness led, they believe, to
the eruption of Oedipal impulses into consciousness.
Nevertheless the psychic deficit and the correlative
diminution of the moral sense did Dot entirely abolish
the Censorship. This latter, henceforth incapable of
repelling the Oedipus complex, concealed it under the
influence of modesty and unconscious shame which sub
sisted in spite of the shamelessness of the utterances,
with the aid of a new conception, the illusion of
doubles, which is, in effect, contemporaneous with
the erotic acknowledgement. At the same time that she
declared her incestous desires to her father, Blanche
took him for a stranger of the same appearance: she
built then a small delirium from which it followed
that her parents had sold their clothing and furniture
to the doubles with whom she lived and who came later
to see her in the asylum.
It was thus not to her true
father but to a double of him that she had made her
voluptuous demonstrations, (p.61)
The invention of the double was a final effort of "the
Censorship," which could no longer repress the Oedipal im
pulses entering consciousness, but could make them accept
able by displacing them from the father to a stranger, a
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double who "looked like” her father.

The patient, "far

from seeking to veil her desire, was irritated at not being
able to satisfy it." (p.62)

She sought to have the "double"

divorce the other woman and marry her.

In distinction

from the first reported case, write Capgras and Carette,
the delusion of doubles in this second patient was preci
pitated not by a feeling of strangeness, but by "a sudden
insight provoked by unconscious shame."(p.62)

The patient

asserted that the truth of her beliefs had been confirmed
by invisible voices and that invisible spirits had put
the appearance of her parents on the strangers who came
to see her.
The fourth case of the delusion of doubles appears in
a brief report by Dupouy and Montassut (1924).

Their pa

tient, also a woman (age not given), suffered from a psycho
tic illness of at least six years’ duration, marked by
auditory hallucinations (commenting, accusing, insulting,
and menacing) and by the delusion of doubles.

She believed

that all her friends had been replaced by doubles and that
a "woman of bad life" had taken her place as well.
'How else explain all the filth I hear? I do nothing
bad, conduct myself without scandal. Why do they ac
cuse me of having made revels with soldiers, why do
they dirty me? I think that all of that happens to
a double I have at home, who dresses herself in my
clothes and who passes for me.'(p.343)
Dupouy and Montassut see the delusion, in their case, as
a defensive process compensating for the difficulties of
the psychotic illness; it permits the patient to make sense
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of her hallucinations and of the changes in her friends'
responses to her.
Capgras reported his third case in 1925. (Capgras,
Lucchini, and Schiff, 1925)

This patient was a woman of

30 suffering from general paresis.

She reported disagree

able body sensations, auditory hallucinations, and a feel
ing of strangeness: "Everything appeared changed to her.
She herself was totally changed."(p.210)

In addition she

suffered hypnogogic phenomena: she visualized herself en
gaging in obscene acts with little men.

And finally, she

believed that her lover had been replaced by a double; she
later asserted that members of her family had also been
doubled.

Capgras, Lucchini, and Schiff assert that the

feeling of strangeness originated in this woman as she be
gan to notice the emaciation caused by her syphilis, that
the feeling of strangeness did not bring about a state of
depersonalization, but rather elicited the delusion of
doubles in an effort to combat the danger of depersonali
zation: "The illusion of doubles appears to us here as an
extreme attempt made by the mind of the patient to struggle
against the grave menace of depersonalization constituted
in the feeling of strangeness."(p.214)

Trying to make

sense of the indefinable feeling of strangeness which
attacked her, a sensation based in an awareness of an in
sidious physiological process (see Hollos and Ferenczi,
1925), this woman reacted by creating the double and thus
explaining the vague changes she was experiencing.
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The world (beings and landscapes) had changed around
her. She herself had changed, and had to struggle to
preserve the sense of herself. Her critical intelli
gence remained nonetheless strong enough to note the
characteristic differences, and she built her illusion
of the double as the only rational explanation of the
change, (p.214)
For this patient the belief in doubles was an intellectual
conclusion, made after acute observation of changed details,
which adequately explained changed conditions.

Her lover,

for example, had in reality left her, then returned to
live with her.

The patient said, "The true Marcel did not

desire me and the new /MarceI-7 wants to resume relations
with me, so he is no longer the same, he has been changed."
(p. 214)
Capgras, Lucchini, and Schiff make two observations
in this report which are of theoretical importance.

First,

comparing this patient to Capgras' two previous reports
and to that of Halberstadt mentioned above, they note that
the process leading to the delusions seems to differ from
case to case; no single pattern emerges.

They note, how

ever, that at first the doubles are always of people to
whom the patient has strong affective ties.

The affective

factor is important:
Transformed into doubles were only those people to
whom the patient was tied with intense affective
sentiment such as, for example, her lover and an
aunt who was very dear to her. (p.215)
(in all these early cases the first claims about doubles
referred to intimates: children, parents, lover.

Where

the illness was of long duration, as in Capgras' first

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17
patient, the delusion seems to have generalized, including
police and doctors, for example.)

The second observation

of importance comes in the effort of Capgras, Lucchini,
and Schiff to relate the delusion of doubles to "normal”
psychological phenomena.

Recognition of others is a com

plex process, and we all experience ephemeral false recog
nitions and misrecognitions. "Who among us," they ask,
"has not happened to encounter a friend having changed in
some commonplace way the habitual aspect of his appearance
and said to ourself:

’this is not he, as I know him, but

someone who resembles him greatly. . .’?"(p.214)
I will not speak at length of other early French pa
pers. (I have located references to approximately 50 cases
reported in French journals from 1923 to 1936 and have
read about half of those cases.)

Of minor historical in

terest is the fact that the delusion of doubles was first
called "Capgras’ Syndrome" by Dupouy and Montassut in their
1924 paper (the fourth reported case) although Jacques Vie
(1930) and Todd, Dewhurst, and Wallis (1981) assert that
the honor was awarded by Levy-Valensi in his paper of 1929.
Also of interest is the fact that all of the 25 to 30
patients reported from 1923 to 1936 seem to have been wo
men; the first man with the delusion is reported by Brochado in 1936.
Two French surveys do call for mention.

Vie (1930)

reviewed the cases of ten patients suffering from errors
of recognition.

He distinguished defects of memory from
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delusional errors and within delusional errors he distin
guished positive doubles, in which non-existent similari
ties

are asserted, from negative doubles, in which non

existent differences are asserted.

An example of the as

sertion of positive doubles comes from a case in which a
woman habitually engaged in sexual activities with many
men and asserted, "They look different, but are my husband."
(p.236)

Vie writes that delusions of positive doubles re

present a more "advanced degree of mental dissociation"
than that which is found in Capgras’ Syndrome, which is for
Vie a delusion of negative doubles found in hallucinatory
psychosis, paranoid dementia, confusional states, depres
sion, general paresis, manic states, and so on.

"The prog

nosis is, then, as variable as those of the states in
which it finds itself inserted. . ."(p.231)

Since the

patients never see the double and the original at the same
time, the syndrome is not an illusion, but an "hypothesis
capable of explaining the changed attitudes of those close
to /the patient/."(p.232)

The delusion begins as a plau

sible explanation; that explanation, once adopted, becomes
the central theme of the delusion. He concludes:
The syndrome of doubles, whether it presents itself
in a positive or negative form, does not carry in
itself any special prognostic indication.
Its gravity
is that of the state which serves as its base. How
ever, one can consider it as the interpretation of
a profound blow to the conscious personality; it rests
in general on substantial troubles in the feeling of
self, primordial base of affectivity; the feeling of
strangeness, of physical and moral change seeming so
paradoxical to the patient that he is unable to restrain
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himself from referring it onto the environment or
from attributing it to some unwonted action of the
environment upon himself, (p.236)
A year after Vie wrote his paper, Larrive and Jasienski (1931) also published a review of the syndrome.

They

follow Vie in distinguishing Capgras' Syndrome, a delusion
of negative doubles, from delusions of positive doubles
in which there are affirmations of imaginary resemblances.
Capgras' Syndrome, they argue, is "characterized by the
refusal to admit, in the presence of known people, their
true identity,"(p.502) and to explain changes in relation
ships by the imposition of doubles.

In addition, only

patients with Capgras' Syndrome use the characteristic
word "double" (sosie).
The syndrome signifies a psychological reaction to
wards the affective modifications which accompany
the psychosis, a correction brought by the patient
to the bizarre sensations and to the feelings of
strangeness which invade him. (p.503)
Summarizing the divergent psychological explanations offered
by previous authors for the onset of the syndrome, Larrive
and Jasienski conclude that there is no single, simple
psychological explanation.
In fact, the illusion of doubles appears secondarily,
in the course of a psychosis. It is a defensive re
action which is opposed to diverse troubles which
threaten one or another element of mental synthesis.
(p.503)
Larrive and Jasienski argue that the syndrome does not in
volve perceptual or memory problems, but rather represents
the least unreasonable explanation a psychotic patient can
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offer to make sense of his experiences.

They note that

the delusion seems to occur most often in the context of
chronic paranoid delusions and that all reported cases have
been of women.

The new case they report is that of a para

noid woman of 52 who claimed that there were doubles of
(in order of assertion) her lover, her sisters, her brotherin-law, and her self.

In their case, as in most others,

there was no sign of intellectual impairment or of neuro
logical problems; their patient, except for her paranoid
illness, was in excellent health.
These early French descriptions leave us with the
following impressions:

Capgras’ Syndrome is best described

as a delusion in which the person believes in the existence
of identical doubles of significant others and/or of him
self.

The delusion can occur in a variety of psychotic

states (most often in paranoid schizophrenia) of both or
ganic and functional origin and can be accompanied by a
wide range of other symptoms.

It is not an illusion, for

no perceptual functions are impaired, nor an hallucinatory
experience like autoscopy, and it is not a defect in memory.
When the delusion is of doubles of others, the patient as
serts that the real person has been replaced by an identi
cal double, although slight changes in appearance or beha
vior are alleged to give evidence of the imposture; when
the delusion is of doubles of the self, the patient asserts
that impostors in his image are at work in the world inter
fering with his life by ruining his reputation or by
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claiming his wealth and property, etc.

The prognosis

for the syndrome is basically that of the psychotic ill
ness.

Explanations for the delusion vary with the parti

cular history of each case, although it is clear that
those who are doubled are always (at least initially, be
fore the delusional system becomes all-encompassing) people
to whom the patient is tied with strong affective bonds.
These early observations, acute and compassionate, are
not significantly altered by more recent studies.

The

early reports present the basic phenomenological descrip
tions and present the basic outlines of the main explana
tory hypotheses that have been offered.

Like later reports,

however, they provide very little information about forma
tive experiences in the early life of the patients who are
described.

More recent studies, to which I will now turn,

present us with two major questions: first, the relation
ship of Capgras' Syndrome to organic aetiology; and second,
the need to develop an adequate psychodynamic hypothesis..
A number of authors have attributed the symptoms of
Capgras’ Syndrome to organic causes.

In the approximately

20 to 25 papers arguing for organic causality, a wide
variety of observations of organic conditions has been
made.

These include:

alcoholism (MacCallum, 1973);
basilar migraine (MacCallum, 1973);
brain tumor (Todd, Dewhurst, and Wallis, 1981);
cerebral atrophy (Gluckman, 1968; Nillson and Perris,1971);
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decreased platelet monoamine oxidase activity
(Sullivan et al.,1978);
diabetes (MacCallum,1973);
EEG abnormalities (Christodoulou,1977,1978a,1978b;
Malliaria and Christodoulou,1977; Kiriakos and
Ananth, 1980) ;
head trauma (Fialkov and Robins, 1978; Weston and
Whitlock, 1971);
low folic acid (MacCallum, 1973);
malnutrition (MacCallum, 1973);
myxedema (Madakasira and Hall, 1981);
organic brain syndrome (Goldfarb, 1974; Goldfarb and
Wiener, 1977; Todd, Dewhurst, and Wallis,1981);

post varicella encephalitis (Nikolovski and Fernandez,
1978);
prosopagnosia (Granacher, 1978; Hayman and Abrams, 1977;
Schraberg and Weitzel, 1979);
pseudohypoparathyroidism (Hay, Jolley, and Jones, 1974;
Preskorn and Reveley, 1978);
right cerebral hemisphere dysfunction (Hayman and
Abrams, 1977; Nillson and Perris, 1971);
temporal lobe epilepsy (Chawla and Virmani, 1977);
toxicity (MacCallum, 1973; Waziri, 1978).
The very variety of organic factors listed would tend to
suggest that no one of these conditions could be the direct
cause of the delusion of doubles.

Some authors, however,

make strong assertions of the necessity of organic condi
tions in producing the delusion.

Waziri (1978), for example,

in discussing one case in which neuroleptic toxicity seemed
to precipitate the delusion, dismisses psychodynamic theory:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23
"In explaining these symptoms one could invoke one of
several facile psychodynamic explanations."(p.257).

Be

cause his patient demonstrated signs of organicity which
"would tend to make psychodynamic explanations inadequate
if not spurious,"(p.357) Waziri emphasizes brain dysfunction:
Capgras' symptoms appear in individuals who have a
brain dysfunction (probably involving the parietal
lobes) as well as a psychosis. Neither_the brain
dysfunction nor the psychosis are /sic/sufficient
basis for the Capgras' symptoms, but the simultane
ous presence of both is necessary to produce these
symptoms, (p.358)
Waziri's patient, a 30 year old woman with a 22 year psychi
atric history, left his care with a diagnosis of chronic
undifferentiated schizophrenia.

While he thoroughly docu

ments early physical problems, he says little of her early
interpersonal experiences.

He does mention that at eight

she sought care for a number of problems and received a
diagnosis of conversion reaction; that she was hospitalized
for six months in her early 20s, displayed paranoid tenden
cies, sustained a marriage for only three months, and came
into his care suffering hallucinations and delusions as
well as Capgras' Syndrome. (Waziri has not read Capgras'
paper: he refers to it, with inaccurate data, as cited in
asoirfcer work.)

Even if the delusion of doubles was triggered

by neuroleptic toxicity— her Capgras' symptom disappeared
when Mellaril was discontinued— this woman clearly had
major problems in living as well.

Waziri concludes that

authors who have reported Capgras' Syndrome as a functional
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phenomenon have simply not discovered the organic com
ponents in their patients.
It is, of course, appropriate to be alert for organic
conditions in psychotic patients, but among authors who
discuss organic factors as contributing to Capgras’
Syndrome there is much contradiction.

In distinction,

for example, to Waziri's (1978) observation that the
delusion of doubles disappeared along with the toxic
psychosis, we must consider Christoudoulou's (1978)
conclusion, based on studies of 11 Capgras patients,
and in agreement with Enoch, Trethowan, and Barker (1967),
that "the progress of Capgras’ syndrome does not neces
sarily follow the course of the associated psychosis."
(p.70)

Christodoulou (1977) in turn,observes that "an

organic cerebral dysfunction probably contributes to
the pathogenesis of the syndrome," (p.562) and cites
substantial differences in Verbal over Performance scores
on the WAIS as giving evidence (along with a variety of
EEG abnormalities) of cerebral dysfunction.

Shraberg and

Weitzel (1979), referring specifically

Christodoulou

to

(1977), report no significant differences between Verbal
and Performance scores in their two cases.
Shraberg and Weitzel (1979) postulate that Capgras’
Syndrome is
a peculiar but particular neuropsychiatric disorder
involving the behavioral expression of an acquired
integrative defecit (i.e., a disorder of facial
recognition) in the presence of a psychopathological
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condition (schizophrenia, paranoid states, or even
depression), (p.315)
This disorder of facial recognition is prosopagnosia, a
disorder which Hayman and Abrams (1977) also postulate
lies at the basis of Capgras' Syndrome.

The contention

that prosopagnosia is the root of the delusion of doubles
must be challenged, however, on the basis of literature
discussion that entity itself.

"Prosopagnosia," writes

Meadows, (1974), "is the specific inability to recognize
familiar faces." (p.489)

Cohn, Newmann, and Wood (1977)

concur, saying prosopagnosia is a "failure to recognize
previously well known faces." (p.178)

A male patient

with prosopagnosia, for example, will not be able to
recognize his wife in a "line-up" with three or four
other women, but will immediately recognize her voice—
and show no delusional thinking or paranoid distrust.
This is clearly different from Capgras patients who
suffer no failure of recognition, but rather attribute
delusional difference of identity to the instantly
recognized facial image.
Most authors who observe organic conditions in
patients with Capgras’ Syndrome recognize as well the
power of psychopathology.

Gluckman (1968) for example,

documents cerebral atrophy but recognizes psychodynamic
significance in the partucular psychology of his
patient.

Nikolovsky and Fernandez (1978) observed a

pathological solution to the problem of ambivalence in
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their post-varicella encephalitis patient.

The patients

of Shraberg and Weitzel (1979) presented in addition to
organic factors diagnoses of schizophrenia and paranoid
personality.

Christodoulou (1977) comments about his

eleven Capgras patients:
It is probably worth noting that, irrespective of
diagnosis, the clinical picture of almost all
patients was dominated by a marked paranoid com
ponent. (p.561)
Organic explanations which ignore dynamic contri
butions are inadequate.

Chawla and Virmani (1977) for

example, describe a patient whose Capgras’ Syndrome
they attribute to temporal lobe epilepsy.

Their patient

accused his father and one brother of being doubles.
He did not include his mother or six other siblings in
the delusion.

But temporal lobe epilepsy should not be

able to discriminate among individuals if its effect is
to create misre.cognition.

This, perhaps, is the strong

est point to be made regarding the necessity of a psycho
dynamic component to the formation of the delusion of
doubles:

the allegation of doubling is always selective,

it is not general.

Particular people are believed to

have been replaced by doubles while others are accepted
as being who they are.

There is not a problem of "mis-

recognition," as some authors would have it,

nor is there

a perceptual problem, but rather there is a problem of
belief, a delusion.

While organic conditions may well
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play a part in the origination or continuation of a
psychotic state, the particular content of psychotic
delusions contains psychological meanings, meanings to
be sought not in lesions, but in the psychodynamics
of the individuals involved.

In addition to their

individual psychology, some commonality must link those
patients who develop the Capgras’ Syndrome.

There

must be some similar psychodynamic preconditions which
can, in certain situations, lead toward the delusion
of doubles.
Efforts to formulate psychodynamic explanations
for Capgras" Syndrome have clustered around four basic
themes emphasizing:

1) Oedipal problems in women (and

in "latent homosexual" men), 2) feelings of strangeness
and other affective problems, 3) problems with ambival
ence, and 4) pathological splitting.

Little has been

added to the descriptive, phenomenological accounts by
Capgras and his associates; indeed, many of the efforts
to explain the syndrome 'icaTk back to CapgrasT own
efforts to find psychological meaning in the delusions
of his three patients.

I will now examine each of these

four basic psychodynamic themes as they appear in the
English language reports I have been able to obtain.
(See Appendix for a list of those cases.)
In what appears to be the first discussion of Capgras’
Syndrome published in English, Coleman (1933) reviews the
French reports, then presents the case of a woman of 50
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who asserted that letters from her daughters were not
genuine, but facsimilies written by someone else.

This

patient seems not to have claimed that her daughters
themselves had been replaced by impostors, nor that
there were doubles of herself, but Coleman suggests
that the psychological mechanism is like that of the
previous French reports.

He adopts the notion in Capgras’

initial report (Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux, 1923) that
the origin of the syndrome rests somehow in feelings of
strangeness; he elaborates on that notion by speaking
of disorders in "coenaesthesia," the normally unconscious
feeling of the ongoing life-functioning of the organism,
which accompanies all processes of perception and of
which a person becomes aware only when perceptual
sensations begin, for some reason, to seem strange.
Colemen then notes that all case reports have been of
woman patients.

(I have read, or found citations to,

a total of 21 reported cases in the French literature
from 1923 to 1933; all were of women.)
cludes:

Coleman con

’’Presumptive evidence would suggest that no

male cases have been described because the syndrome does
not occur in men and that the mechanism is peculiar to
women.”(p.49)

To explain this sex bias he observes that

Men are on the whole more objective, and tend to take
the outer world very much for granted. Women, on the
contrary., are more subjective, and their whole atti
tude towards the environment is colored by a mistrust
of the reality and absolute significance of the object,
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with a resultant tendency to correct their objective
findings by a subjective evaluation, (p.49)
He supports this supposition by referring to Freud's 1931
paper, "Female Sexuality.”

For women, but not for men,

argues Coleman, the resolution of the Oedipal complex
requires the transfer of libidinal aims from mother to
father, with concomitant growth in hostile feelings
toward the mother,

Coleman concludes that

Whatever the reason, the significant fact is that at
a certain state in the little girl's life it is forced
in upon her consciousness that she has been deceived
in her object love; she finds herself hating where
she had formerly only adored. Such a dramatic up
heaval, requiring a complete reversal of former
evaluations, would colour all subsequent reactions,
and account for much that is distinctive in female
psychology.
"Things are not what they seem”— "I have
loved where I should have hated"; such are the impres
sions induced by this experience. From then onwards
her attitude is characterized, not by ambivalence,
but by a mistrust of the object; it may not be what
it appears. And if at any time psychic disintegration
occurs, it will be the object and not the self that
will be found to be at fault....The female from
infancy onward has had her faith in her object-love
shattered. The mother being proved false in the
beginning, all subsequent love-objects carry the
same pattern. People are not what they seem; decep
tion has occurred before and may occur again. The
psychotic woman, rather than doubt the genuineness of
her own feelings, decomposes the object and postulates
the existence of doubles. (p.50-51)
In a second paper Colemen (1934) reviews doubles in liter
ature and notes that almost all stories or novels on this
theme are about doubles of the self of a male character;
only

one novel, Dostoevsky’s The Possessed, contains a

scene in which a character, a woman, claims that doubles
of others (in this case a husband) exist.

Colemen writes,
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So far, then, it has been established that in an
unbalanced mental state, subjective decomposition
is liable to occur in men with the postulation of
a double self. In women, on the contrary, under
psychic stress decomposition of the object is the
more likely mechanism, the resulting syndrome
being the "Illusion of Doubles." (p.271)
The proposition that Capgras’ Syndrome afflicted
women only was challenged in 1936 in a report by Murray.
Murray (1936) describes a male patient of 32 who after
several years of hospitalization for schizophrenia
asserted that his parents were doubles.
this man had been shy and solitary.

As a child

"The father regards

his son with soft sentimental feelings, and has always
been inclinced to ’mother’ him." (p.63)

As a young man

he was reserved, obsessional, and hypochondriacal.

He

gave up work and hobbies, began to hallucinate, and
developed paranoid delusions.

Murray accepts Coleman's

notions of Oedipal development and (fitting case into
theory, perhaps) concludes that this case of Capgras'
Syndrome in a male can be explained by the presence of
"latent homosexuality."
Reviewing the history of the case described here
there are certain features which strongly suggest
a latent homosexuality. The patient is physically
well developed, but of exaggerated complexion, the
"milk and roses" type. His known difficulty in
attaining adequate heterosexual adjustments and the
revealing nature of the hallucinatory content,
"Nancy boy," show that there is a difficulty of this
order present.
If we consider that the course of development of
infantile sexuality in homosexual males follows the
lines of that already described in the female, we
can see an explanation of the occurence of Capgras'
Syndrome in the case described, (p.66)
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(It should be noted that in the same year as Murray -wrote,
Brochado /1936/ also presented the case of Capgras' Syn
drome in a male patient, but without any special comment.)
The Oedipal hypothesis disappears from the literature by
the early 1940s as Davidson (1941) reported Capgras' Syn
drome in two men where homosexuality was not an issue.
Subsequently, many cases have been reported in men; of
the 124 cases I have listed in the Appendix, 70 are of
women, 51 are men (3 reports do not specify sex).

If the

problem were Oedipal, it would be seen much more often
in psychotic women; if it were restricted to women, we'd
not see it in men.

As an explanatory hypothesis, then,

it is grossly unsatisfactory.
Davidson's patients, both men at Manhattan State Hos
pital, claimed that their wives were doubles.

He writes

that the alleged "differences" between the "double” and
the "real wife” which were mentioned by these men were in
ventions in support of the delusion, not perceptual prob
lems.

His efforts at explanation present a melange of

positions: he notes that the dynamics of reported cases
are quite different, but then tries to find common quali
ties through a combination of the ideas of "feelings of
strangeness," a "double attitude toward the present and
toward past experiences," "depersonalization and dereali
zation," "coenesthesia^"

"projecting and identifying

mechanism,""and regression to a magic form of thinking."
(pp. 519,520,521)
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Other authors present more economical explanations
predicated on the importance of the feeling of strangeness
and related affective states.

The basic notion here is that

the patient becomes aware of changes in his customary af
fective responses to significant people in his life.

These

changes in affective response can be triggered by actual
alterations in interpersonal life.

Haslam (1973), for ex

ample, presents a case of Capgras' Syndrome in a schizo
phrenic woman who developed the delusion that her

fiance

had been replaced by a double— at the time he, in actuality,
had developed a schizophrenic illness.

Unable to accept

the changes in him, suggests Haslam, she declared him to
be an impostor.

Siomopoulos and Goldsmith (1975) report

a case like that of Capgras' third patient (Capgras, Luc
chini, and Schiff, 1925), in which a paranoid schizophrenic
man, frustrated in his ambitions as well as by his illness,
developed Capgras' Syndrome.

They write:

We assume that the patient with the typical Capgras'
Syndrome, after experiencing unacceptable changes in
himself and his conditions of living, projects them
onto persons closely related to him (probably the ones
he considers responsible for these changes) to the
effect that the initial 'I have changed, I am not the
person I used to be' becomes 'He has changed, he is
not the person he used to b e , ' and subsequently, through
the processes of denial and rationalization, 'He is
not the real one, he is an impostor.' (p.756)
(Other authors as well discuss the feeling of strangeness,
for example: Bankier, 1966; Merrin and Silberfarb, 1976;
Mikkelson and Gutheil, 1976.)

Whatever the origin of the

shift in feelings, it is misunderstood, transformed, and
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the result is the assertion of the existence of doubles.
"Things are different with me and him," the patient may
think, "I've never felt this way with him, so it can't be
him, he is an impostor who looks identical: a double."
The notion that feelings of strangeness, especially in
close relationships, may lie at the heart of Capgras' Syn
drome reminds us of the importance of the actual experi
ences and relationships of those who develop the delusion,
but we are left with the question of why such emotional
changes, which occur frequently, should produce the speci
ficity of the rare delusion of doubles rather than a vari
ety of other responses.

Hypotheses stressing the problem

of ambivalence attempt to deal with that question.
Tood (1957) presents a discussion of seven cases of
Capgras’ Syndrome, five in women, two in men, and his dis
cussion offers a number of provocative observations.

Cit

ing anthropological evidence, primarily from Crawley (1914),
he notes that ideas of doubles are common in primitive cul
tures where often the soul is believed to be an exact re
plica of the person.

Some cultures believe that shadows,

reflections, and dream images are the visible forms of
the soul.

Todd also notes the Greek story of Amphitryon,

and he observes that dualism, or the belief in polar op
posites, is a basic motif of primitive philosophy.

He

concludes that "the disintegration of the personality
doubtless sets free primitive modes of thought, which in
clude the tendency to think in terms of doubles and
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dualism." (p.263)

Todd asserts that in Capgras' Syndrome

the patient splitsthe object of his delusion into debased
and sanctified images and thus "offers an effective solu
tion to the problem of ambivalent emotions, a Jeky11prototype being differentiated from a Hyde-double, or more
rarely, vice versa."(p.264)

Noting that the person "doubled"

is always linked to the patient by intimate emotional bonds,
Todd sees the syndrome being determined by an interaction
of factors: first, the psychotic regression to primitive
thinking and belief in dualism; second, a paranoid state;
third, the presence of marked ambivalence.
The notion that Capgras' Syndrome represents a psycho
tic solution to the problem of ambivalence has been accept
ed by a variety of authors: Arieti and Meth (1959), Dally
and Gomez (1979), Enoch, Trethowan, and Barker (1967),
Meissner (1977), Moskowitz (1972), Nikolevski and Fernan
dez (1978), and Vogel (1974), for example.

In his presen

tation of five cases of Capgras' Syndrome, Vogel (1974) de
scribes the process as follows:
Repression finally fails and is no longer successful
in binding the patient to her strongly ambivalent
feelings in regard to her love object. She begins to
feel that she hates as well as loves this emotionally
important individual. This realization is the fons et
origo of the special and qualitatively unusual features
found in the syndrome.(p.923). . . The love object is
split into a good and bad individual who, of course,
outwardly resemble one another almost exactly.(p.924)
. . .The Capgras Syndrome rather elegantly shows the
major use of the defense mechanisms of ambivalence,
concretization of mental representations, splitting
of the object, displacement, projection, and identifi
cation— or rather, misidentification.
In very visible
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fashion, under the threat of disintegrating forces,
the ego makes a desperate psychotic effort to main
tain some relationship with its love object, (p.924)
In the first edition of the American Handbook of Psychiatry
(1959), Arieti and Meth suggest that the double is always
an important person, that the patient in some way rejects
that person, but that the patient cannot allow himself to
be conscious of that rejection because of guilt or ambi
valence, and so displaces his rejecting feelings onto the
"double" in "an unusual form of psychotic displacement"
(p.549) that has "not yet been fully explained."(p.550)
Enoch, Trethowan, and Barker (1967), modifying Enoch's
(1963) earlier emphasis on affect change, conclude, "Two
fundamental opposing views of the same person are present,
and this ambivalence is the basis of the psychopathology
of the condition."(p.8)

They suggest that the invention

of the "double" allows the patient to express his hostility
without risking the guilt that would ensue from such ex
pressions directed at a loved person.

Meissner (1977)

concurs, stating, "The origins of this doubling of the ob
ject seem to lie in the patient's intolerable ambivalence
toward the significant love object."(p.424)

And Nikolevski

and Fernandez (1978) conclude their report by stating:
The delusion of doubles in its psychodynamic aspects
is the psychotic solution to the problem of ambivalence;
it is an unusual defense reaction, a desperate and
ultimate attempt at coping with an intolerable intra
psychic conflict, (p.41)
The suggestion that Capgras' Syndrome is a psychotic
solution to the problem of ambivalence, however, leaves us
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with questions about why the ambivalence should be so
intolerable in these patients and why their response is
to split the object into "real" and "impostor" rather
than to institute some other psychological "solution."
The key may lie in the word "split," for if the signifi
cant people in the patients' lives have in some sense
never been accepted in normally integrated ambivalence,
then perhaps ambivalence when felt becomes intolerant.
It is to the concept of splitting, then, that we must next
turn.
The concept of splitting has recently been put for
ward as an explanatory hypothesis capable of illuminating
the Capgras' Syndrome. (Arieti and Bemporad, 1974; Cavenar,
Maltbie, and Petty, 1977; Dally and Gomez, 1979; Lehmann,
1980; Mikkelsen and Gutheil, 1976; Moskowitz, 1972,1973.)
In the second edition of the American Handbook of Psychi
atry Arieti and Bemporad (1974) write, "This syndrome seems
to represent in a dramatic fashion what Melanie Klein
proposed as the early infantile solution to ambivalence,
the 'splitting' of the parent into good and bad imagos."
(p.714).

Lehmann (1980) in The Comprehensive Textbook of

Psychiatry, III writes that in the Capgras’ Syndrome "The
splitting of a person who constitutes an important libidinal object into his good and bad parts— a basic psychodynamic mechanism— is transduced into perceptual reality
by the patient."(p.1993)

The notion of splitting, which
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I will discuss in greater detail below, is of particular
use in thinking about the delusion of doubles for two
principal reasons: first, the concept of splitting allows
for the theoretical linkage of the affect state and ambi
valence hypotheses (see, for example, Dally and Gomez,
1979); and second, the concept of splitting can be anchored
in developmental stages (Lehmann, 1980; Mikkelsen and
Gutheil, 1976; Moskowitz, 1972), thus allowing for under
standing of both normal and pathological phenomena.
Moskowitz (1972), who has reported the only success
ful psychotherapeutic treatment of Capgras’ Syndrome (all
other successes are attributed to chemical or convulsive
treatments), notes:
Capgras1 Syndrome, then, is a complicated situation
in which "delusional” belief, usually paranoid, is
linked to an affective response— a feeling of strange
ness— which results in the conviction that a familiar
person is a look-alike impostor.(p.59) The splitting
of an ambivalently held object into good and bad
(impostor) parts is represented in the distortion of
perceptual reality. It is a mechanism whereby the
undesirable parts of the particular object may be
rejected without incurring as much guilt as in re
jecting the total object, (p.61)
The internalized object is split— I shall suggest how
below— into a "good," consciously acknowledged, image and
a "bad," repressed and unconscious image.

Those images

persist until a change in the interpersonal relationship
triggers a significant affective shift.

Two responses

ensue: first, the patient concludes that "He/she wouldn't
make me feel that way— he/she is different, a double;"
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and second, the patient experiences feelings that cannot
be addressed to the consciously held object but that force
their way into awareness— "I hate him/her, but I wouldn't
feel that way to the ’real' him/her because he/she is so
good." (The patient may additionally conclude that expressed
hostile feelings might provoke massive retaliation.)

The

dilemma is resolved by declaring that a double, an appro
priate target for negative feelings, has replaced the good
real person.

This pathological process, Moskowitz (1972)

argues, has its roots in the normal developments of the
separation-individuation stage.

I should note here that

the "double" in Capgras’ Syndrome is most often a nega
tively regarded figure, but the concept of splitting would
also allow for negatively regarded real objects and dis
sociated positive feelings which, when they press into
awareness, produce anxiety. (See, for example, Christodoulou's /1978/ description of positively regarded doubles.)
An object relations approach was taken by Moskowitz
(1972) in his treatment of a 12 year old boy who displayed
Capgras1 Syndrome.

Because Moskowitz reports the only

detailed account of a psychotherapeutic treatment of the
syndrome, including information about early interpersonal
experiences of a patient, it is useful to summarize his
experience.

The boy whom Moskowitz treated became fright

ened that his parents and younger brother had been replaced
by doubles, whom he called "aliens? and whom he likened to
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the extra-terrestrial ’’invaders" of a then-popular tele
vision show.

"Small differences in the usual expected

appearance or action of a family member would elicit an
xiety, "(p.46)

The immediate families of both parents in

cluded relatives with severe mental illness; the mother ex
pressed reservations about two such people marrying and
having children and, in addition, endured three unsuccess
ful pregnancies before the birth of this boy.
The boy was named after a schizophrenic uncle who
died a suicide.

He was raised according to rigid guide

lines by his mother, the father deferring entirely to his
wife.

When he was 15 months old the mother spent eight

days away from home to give birth to her second child.
The boy then developed gastro-intestinal problems which
continued until he was four.

He also showed other forms

of regressive behavior, including delayed toilet training,
sitting to urinate, and use of a pacifier.

During the

years before he came into Moskowitz's care he was a guarded
and unspontaneous child.

The boy seemed to feel a con

flict related to "the rigid disciplining mother and the
concerned protective mother."(p.52)

He called both parents

"fakes."
David's preoccupation with doubles, fakes, and 'aliens'
continued intermittently throughout the entire period
he was in treatment.
It would become more apparent
and troublesome when David felt angry or resentful
toward people in his family or toward me. As I became
familiar with the pattern I began reminding him of
the affect just preceding his reaction.
Initially
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he denied any connection. Later he agreed that
he had negative feelings toward the person whose
identity had seemed to change, (p.53)
The boy included Moskowitz in the delusion, but Moskowitz
was able to use this to demonstrate even more clearly
"that feeling states might produce psychic phenomena" and
to increase the boy's insight.
The patient Moskowitz treated seems to have had the
kind of early disruptions in object relations which could
provoke split internalized object-representations: a mother
whose "concerned protective" image could hardly be recon
ciled with a "rigid disciplining" image; a mother who left
him at 15 months with a father who had previously had al
most nothing to do with his care.

While Moskowitz does

not offer his suggestions about what events might have
precipitated the initial development of the delusion, he
does indicate clearly that changes in feeling states seemed
to trigger the intermittent belief that the parents had
been replaced.

(See also the three similar examples, one

from Bettelheim

]_1976/,

Chapter IV.)

two from my own experience, in

The success of the therapy seems to have lain

in Moskowitz's ability to help the boy recognize how these
contrasting affective states, triggered by some interper
sonal interchange, elicited ideas of the protective, reas
suring "reality" or the hostile, frightening "imposture"
of the parental figures.
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To understand adequately the process of splitting
and its applicability to the Capgras' Syndrome, one must
enter the sometimes convoluted realms of "object relations
theory," the psychoanalytic theory of how we internalize
representations or images of significant others and of
ourselves and how we integrate those internalized repre
sentations and are affected by them.

I have found that

that the works most useful for my thinking about the de
lusion of doubles are those of Otto Kernberg (1972,1975,
1976).

Kernberg argues that earliest experiences are

internalized according to their affective valence: posi
tive experience (instinctual gratification, satiation,
loving mother-child interaction) has at the start a
globally "good" affective character which is internalized
along with initially undifferentiated self-representations
and object-representations; while negative experience
(frustration, rage, anxiety-laden or hostile mother-child
interaction) is internalized around a "bad” affective
tone and its associated self- and object-representations.
In very early infancy, then, a "good" internal object com
posed of undifferentiated self- and object-representations
is separately internalized, or split, from a "bad" internal
object.

It is because of the opposite affective states

that these early internalized representations are kept apart, at first simply because they occur separately and
the infantile ego is as yet incapable of integrating them,
and later because of anxiety.

Each new experience brings
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with it an image of self and an image of object, with
an affect state linking them.

Gradually, as the ego be

gins to distinguish self and not-self, the self-represen
tations begin to fuse and a differentiation of self-image
from object-image occurs in the core "good" self-object
image.
To the norms! splitting of earliest infancy is added
the defensive splitting which begins at about three or
four months, peaks at six to twelve months, and then
diminishes during the second year.

Defensive splitting

is utilized to keep apart the libidinally invested and
aggressively invested self- and object-representations
in order to protect the ideal, good relationship with the
mother from "contamination" by the "bad" self-representations and representations of her.

In normal development,

good and bad self-representations are integrated into a
realistic self-concept, and good and bad object-represen
tations are integrated into a total object-representation:
the infant has learned that he and mother are separate and
now recognizes that the "good" and "bad" mother are one
and the same, sometimes interacting with him in satisfying
and happy ways, sometimes bringing frustration and unhap
piness.

With self differentiated from object and with the

integration of self-images and object-images, it is possible
for ideal self-images to coalesce with ideal object-images
into an "ideal self" as precursor to the superego.

Repression

replaces splitting as a defensive process, and the child
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grows toward healthy ego-identity.
Splitting, then, is a normal developmental process in
earliest infancy, a normal and diminishing defensive pro
cess in the first two years of life.

Splitting is not only

of affect states but of object-images and self-images as
well, and because internalizations are crucial to the or
ganization and integration of the ego, the process of
splitting splits the ego as an organization.

"This active

separation by the ego of positive and negative introjections, which implies a complete division of the ego, and,
as a consequence, of external reality as well, is, in
essence, the defensive mechanism of splitting."(Kernberg,
1976, p.36)

As has been mentioned, in normal development

the defensive process of splitting diminishes in the
second year of life and is eventually superceded by re
pression, but in pathological situations splitting can be
maintained; it becomes a "pathological dissociation of
polar opposite ego states in order to prevent an allpervasive anxiety and fear of destruction.” (Kernberg,
1972, p.239)

If splitting becomes excessive, pathological,

then the split-off, hostile "bad" representations are
never allowed to fuse with their "good" counterparts, but
rather
the most frightening units involving self and object
images under the influence of primitive affect are re
pressed and this interferes with their ultimate differ
entiation and integration within the total personality.
Primitive unrealistic self- and object-representations
remain relatively unchanged in the id, and so do their
correspondingly primitive, overwhelming affect disposi
tions. (Kernberg, 1976, p.70)
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Initially split then repressed "bad” representations,
originally internalized in primitive, infantile form, re
main out of consciousness; while idealized "good" selfand object-representations are accessible to consciousness.
But why should defensive splitting become pathological?
"Environmental factors, particularly severe chronic frus
trations in early childhood, appear as the predominant
etiological factor." (Kernberg, 1972, p.242)

Pathological

disruption of personality development occurs, in Kernberg’s
view, from distortions in the internalization of interper
sonal relations.

"Early maternal deprivation determines

abnormal personality development through the intermediate
variable represented by faulty internalized object rela
tions." (Kernberg, 1972, p. 233)
I would suggest (along with Moskowitz, 1972; Arieti
and Bemporad, 1972; and Lehmann, 1980), that pathological
defensive splitting of internalized object-representations
is at the psychodynamic root of the Capgras’ Syndrome.

In

brief, the patient who develops the delusion of doubles
has suffered early maternal deprivation of the sort that
prohibits the normal fusion of "good" self-representations
with "bad" self-representations and "good" object-represen
tations with "bad” object-representations.

Defensive

splitting increases, rather than diminishing with maturity,
and images of people who enter the life of the patient are
continually fragmented into "good” and "bad" internalized
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representations.

An idealized "all good" self-represen

tation is accessible to consciousness, as is an "all good"
object-representation, while the split "all bad" images
are dissociated and unconscious.

Later in life some event

precipitates the awareness of previously unconscious images
and associated feelings.

The event may be a sudden affec

tive shock caused by changes in an important interpersonal
relationship (emotional disappointment, a rejection, or
a genuine alteration in the other) at which point the pa
tient is unable to integrate his newly conscious bad feel
ing because his image of the other has excluded the possi
bility of mixed or ambivalent responses.

The negative

affect, fear, and anxiety elicit the "bad" representations
hitherto split and repressed, and the patient concludes
that the person with whom he is dealing cannot be the
person he has always known.

So different are the images

and feelings that the patient can conclude that the other
person is therefore a double.

A similar pattern could

develop if the precipitating affective change were to
occur within the patient himself, due to depersonalization,
“feelings of strangeness," or the onset of a psychotic
illness.

The patient again feels unfamiliar and uneasy

in the presence of a significant other and the rise to
consciousness of previously unconscious bad representations
stimulates the delusional elaboration.

A variation might

be that the patient senses that he is no longer the person
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he once was, rejeets that feeling because his all-good
self image cannot integrate it, and concludes that it is
the other who is causing him to feel different, that the
other person has changed.
The concept of splitting, then, seems able to encompass
feelings of strangeness, affective changes, and problems
of ambivalence, and is thus the most useful construct with
which to approach the delusion of doubles. It would seem
that for the development of Capgras* Syndrome a convergence
of three phenomena would be necessary, if we are to explain
both the process of the delusional formation and the rela
tive rarity of its occurrence.

These phenomena are: first,

strong paranoid characteristics, noted by Capgras and
Reboul-Lachaux (1923) in the first report as well as by
Christodoulou (1978) more recently; second, the presence
of a psychotic state, induced by organic or functional
conditions; and third, a history of disturbed early object
relations leading toward unintegrated, internalized selfand object-representations and the pathological defense
mechanism of splitting.
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III
The Case History

The family of Dr. F. (for she was, in addition to
everything else, a fully qualified physician) had suffered
dreadfully during the Holocaust. Her father, a rabbi and
school teacher, and her mother, the principal of a religious
school, were hidden by a Christian woman who had worked
as their housekeeper in a town near the Polish-German bor
der.

They were childless at the time, having tried unsuc

cessfully for many years to conceive a child.

While in

hiding, however, Mrs. F. became pregnant. By subterfuge she
was able to enter a local hospital and there gave birth to
a boy, but she was recognized by a non-Jewish former neigh
bor and fled back to the housekeeper's basement with the
just-born child.

The F . ’s protector, however, was herself

childless, and the infant's crying if overheard posed a
lethal threat of detection to all.

The housekeeper took

the boy to a convent to be cared for by nuns, but the nuns
gave him up for adoption to a farmer.

The good housekeeper

continued to hide the F.'s and made weekly trips to the
farm where their son was being raised, ostensibly to buy
or beg food, actually to observe the boy's progress and
report to the hidden parents.
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After Russian troops drove the Nazi forces back, Mr.
F. understandably but rashly ran to the farm where his son,
now a toddler, was living.

He claimed his son, but the

irate farmer drove the distraught father away with threats
of death.

The next day Mr. F. contacted Russian troops

and managed to convince them to go with him to the farm.
The farmer showed them a freshly dug grave and told them
the boy was dead.

No one was ever to know if the boy in

deed had died or if he had been hidden elsewhere.
Several days later the farmer reported to a different
group of Russians that Mr. F. had been a Nazi collarborator.
Mr. F. was arrested and sent to a Russian labor camp near
Minsk, sentenced to five years at hard labor.

Such horror

upon horror seems inconceivable, but as Krystal and Niederland (1968) point out, "Survivors of disasters and perse
cutions are suspected of unfair play, collaboration with
the enemy, or harlotry."(p. 343)

In the labor camp fate

played yet another trick: Mr. F. was noticed and interro
gated by a Russian officer, also Jewish, who believed his
story.

The officer ordered Mr. F. to the camp infirmary for

several weeks of rest, then called him back and told him
that papers had been prepared indicating that he had "died"
while in the camp— and he could return home and try to find
his wife. Mr. F. was reunited with his wife, and they made
their way to a displaced persons center in Vienna.

There,

in the spring of 1947, Mrs. F. gave birth to a second child,
her daughter, Dr. F.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49
I was unable to investigate thoroughly the Holocaust
experiences of Dr. F.'s parents (her father had died in
1971; her mother, a broken woman, lived in a nursing home),
but I was able to obtain some information about their home
life from Dr. F.'s uncle and from her cousin, also a physi
cian about her age.

We know too, from an extensive litera

ture, the nature of the effects of the Holocaust on the
survivors and on their children.

It is to that literature

that I now must turn.
Numerous authors (Eitinger, 1962; Krystal and Niederland, 1968; Ledere, 1965; Niederland, 1964b, 1968; Trossman,
1968) have described the "survivor syndrome" which afflicts
so many who endured internment, terror, torture, and humi
liation during the Holocaust.

The syndrome includes:

chronic anxiety and depression; sleep disturbances, includ
ing insomnia and nightmares; psychosomatic symptoms; chronic
fatigue; disturbances of cognition, memory, and concentra
tion; irritability, emotional lability or moodiness; ob
sessive ruminations, moroseness and apprehensiveness; social
isolation, withdrawal and inability to enjoy life; and
survivor guilt.

Few, if any, survivors seem to have es

caped one or more of these symptoms.

Several authors (Nie

derland, 1964b; Eitinger, 1962) comment on the troubling
memories that enter the consciousness of survivors in associ
ation to harmless or even benign experiences.

Eitinger

(1962), for example, writes of such painful associations,
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They can occur in any connection whatsoever, from
seeing a person stretching his arms and associating
this with fellow prisoners hung up by their arms under
torture, to seeing an avenue of trees and visualizing
long rows of gallows with hanging corpses. Children
playing peacefully may suddenly and without apparent
cause call to mind other children, emaciated, tortured,
murdered, (p. 372)
While most authors write primarily of survivors who were
incarcerated in Nazi camps, it is important to bear in
mind that the terror and torment were no less traumatic
for those who survived in ghettos or in hiding.

Ostwald

and Bittner (1968), for example, in writing of their sub
jects who survived in hiding, declare:
From the accounts available to us, we can say that
the fugitive existence of those who escaped the
Nazi dragnet and subsisted in forests and bunkers
was as suffused with terror and martyrdom as was the
life of concentration camp inmates, (p. 89)
Venzlaff (1964), writing of those who survived in hiding,
notes
a striking resemblance of the mental disorders in
such persecuted persons, who were not in prisons
and not in concentration camps, with those mental
disorders which we could find in patients who very
often spent many years in concentration camps,
ghettos, or work camps, under severe and somatic
strain, (p. 178)
If the survivor syndrome was present, even to a moder
ate degree, in Dr. F.'s parents, we need to explore the
effects on Dr. F . , for as Lipkowitz (1973) writes, "It
must be anticipated that the psychic scarring of the survi
vors will have noxious effects upon the development of
their children." (p.141)

I have reviewed some of the li

terature on children of Holocaust survivors (Borocas and
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Borocas, 1973, 1980; Epstein, 1977, 1980; Fogelman and
Savran, 1980; Freyberg, 1980; Klein, 1973; Krystal and
Niederland, 1968; Lipkowitz, 1973; Rakoff, Sigal, Epstein,
1967; Sigal and Rakoff, 1971; Sigal, Silver, Rakoff, and
Ellin, 1973; Trossman, 1968) and can summarize some of
the effects on parenting and child development attributed
to the massive psychic trauma experienced by the survivors.
Of most importance, perhaps, in terms of parent-child
relations are what Niederland (1968) has observed, after
clinical observations of some 800 survivors, as
Tendency to isolation, withdrawal, and brooding
seclusion; tenuous and unstable object relations,
with marked ambivalence notable in lasting dis
turbances of object relations, (p.313)
Survivor parents are described as being over-protective
and overly anxious about the health and well-being of their
children.

They are frightened that something terrible

will happen to them, and are often beset by persecution
dreams in which their children are victimized.

Their wor

ries engender anxiety and mistrustfulness in their children.
(Borocas and Borocas, 1973; Freyberg, 1980; Krystal and
Niederland, 1968; Trossman, 1968)

The mothers are described

as withdrawn, depressed, fearful, uncommunicative; they
are bound to their past and often unable to respond ade
quately to their growing children.
Because of their total preoccupation with tormenting
memories and with an unending re-living of their trau
matic past, the parents have few emotional resources
left over to meet any but the most routine psychological
pressures. The continually changing emotional needs and
their children’s requests for attention and care are
either ignored or dealt with as unfair demands. (Rakoff,
Sigal and Epstein, 1967, p. 24)
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While the considerations mentioned above apply to
a wide sampling of survivor parents, a special tragic edge
is added to the pain of those who lost children during
the Holocaust while managing to survive themselves.

Speak

ing of this issue, Ostwald and Bittner (1968) note, "Those
who lost children as a result of the persecution were
among the saddest and most guilt-ridden patients in our
sample." (p.88)

Niederland (1968) notes that chronic de

pressive states correlate highly with the specific trauma
of the loss of a child, and Krystal and Niederland (1968)
observe that in their sample "Survivor guilt was specifi
cally strongly correlated to the loss of children, both in
2

incidence and severity (X =54.30; f=26, reliable at the
.001 level."(p.331)

Often survivors who lost a child feel

that they have sacrificed that child to save their own
lives. (Klein,1973)
We know that, in general, women who have survived the
Holocaust have had difficulties as mothers.

Krystal and

Niederland (1968) write of their sample:
Of the women in this series, only 2 per cent were
considered completely successful in their function
as wives and mothers, and 45 (49 per cent) of all
women were grossly inadequate as housekeepers and
mothers, (p.332)
Most of the authors studying parent-child interaction find
difficulty occurring in pre-Oedipal stages of development.
Klein (1973), commenting on the child's anal phase experi
ments with autonomy and separation, notes that "The child's
strivings create anxiety, aggression, and feelings of help

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53
lessness in the mother," and adds that "the fearful atti
tude of the parents is shared by the children and is mani
fested in the difficulty of both separating from each other."
(p.406)

Freyberg (1980) argues that children of Holocaust

survivors rarely achieve a complete traversing of the
separation-individuation process described by Mahler (1972).
Freyberg notes that the child striving toward autonomy
needs its mother's love and support, but that survivor
mothers fear and disapprove of those strivings and so en
gender depression and axiety about the loss of the mother
in their children.
It is at this crucial juncture of the individuation
process that the mourning, grieving, affect-lame,
guilty, and overwhelmed survivor mother has difficul
ty gratifying her child's need for emotional respon
siveness and availability, (p. 91)
In a world she feels is unsafe, the survivor mother re
sponds negatively to the child's efforts at separation.
The child in turn responds to the mother's anxiety and be
comes highly ambivalent about autonomy and separateness;
the frightening anger engendered by the mother's inability
to gratify must however be repressed; the child cannot in
dividuate, for it is too much a loss for the parents, too
great a risk for itself.

Lipkowitz (1973) summarizes:

Burdened by guilt, tension, and fear, she /the mother/
cannot assist in another separation.
In addition, from
Erikson’s point of view the chronically depressed and
withdrawn mother cannot inspire basic trust, without
which the capacity to accept the reality that symbiosis
with the mother cannot be maintained will not develop. . .
Unable to tolerate separation, the concentration camp
mother cues for symbiosis,with expected results, (p.152)
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Krystal and Niederland (1968) agree with Freyberg (1980)
and Lipkowitz (1973).

They note in addition that survivors

have great difficulty expressing aggression as well as in
nurturing and responding to children, and they conclude:
The repression of aggression tends to produce prob
lems of aggression in the next generation. The im
pairment of the ability for nurturing of the children
tends to produce depressions in the next generation.
Both problems tend to promote symbiotic relationships
and interfere with the individuation of the youngster.
. . .the irreparable loss is that of faith and trust
in one's fellow man and in the essential benign nature
of the world. The disturbance here is so profound that
the benign introjects become unavailable as patterns
for mothering and nurturing behavior. . . .The survi
vors form abnormal families and communities. The fa
milies tend to be sado-masochistic and affect-lame.(p.346)
This devastating pattern of child-rearing and family life
produces, of course, devastating effects upon the children.
In speaking of the children of survivors Ostwald and
Bittner (1968) write, "Their environment looks tense,
dreary, and emotionally impoverished."(p.93)

Fogelman and

Savran (1980) note that the children are over-protective
toward the parents and have a guilt-ridden attitude toward
their parents who have suffered so much; they feel a need
to identify with their parents' suffering, yet feel they
cannot talk about Holocaust atrocities for fear of hurting
their parents or discovering some shameful way in which
their parents survived.

The children fantasize about com

pensating their parents and replacing lost relatives (for
whom they are often named), and they struggle with the prob
lem of identifying with and mourning for people they never
knew.

"Many of them spoke of an overwhelming burden of
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responsibility to fulfill their parents' needs and to
replace dead siblings or other relatives." (p.104)

Frey

berg (1980) writes of similar patterns in which rage trig
gered by unmet needs for emotional relatedness is repressed
and a consuming concern for the well-being of the parents
leads the child to assume responsibility for parental health
and happiness.

On both conscious and unconscious levels,

notes Lipkowitz (1973), the children feel "After all they
have been through, how can I hurt them any more?"(p.l47)
The children, then, strive for parental love and approval
by being over-protective, by fulfilling the felt or stated
expectations of their parents, by being good and successful
and by trying to repress whatever anger they sense within
themselves— and this in the context of anxiety ridden,sym
biotic ambivalence caused by incomplete individuation.
The patient who came to our psychiatric service bore
the scars not only of her schizophrenic illness, but also
of the cataclysmic historical trauma of the Holocaust as
experienced by her parents.

Her developing the delusion

of doubles can best be understood by object relations theory,
but much of the content of her delusional system reflects
the personal and cultural nightmare of terror and despair
that had been the lot of her parents; and even the original
disruptions in the mother-child relationship which laid
the basis for the delusion are at least in part the result
of the massive psychic trauma of survivors.

I will now

present the case material and follow with an object relations
analysis.
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That Dr. F. 's parents suffered irreparable psychic
harm can be assumed by extrapolating from the survivor
syndrome— but I also obtained confirmation in the recol
lections of Dr. F . ’s cousin.

The cousin described Dr. F.'s

father as a "timid scholar-type" who spent his days "read
ing at home in his slippers" and who "over-protected" his
daughter; he described Dr. F.'s mother as a woman whose
"spirit was broken during the war" and whose visits he
dreaded because of her "morbid preoccupation with death
and dying."

Dr. F . , by contrast, described her father as

"an administrator type, organized, forthright,” and de
scribed her mother as "a homemaker, kind and helpful."
The cousin described Dr. F.'s home as dark and dreary;
the parents as apprehensive, fearful, and mistrustful; Dr.
F. as a child as isolated, aloof, and lonely.
scribed a "happy, stable home."

Dr. F. de

The small apartment in

which Dr. F. lived with her parents was in an old building
in a decaying neighborhood; for ten or fifteen years pre
ceding her hospitalization with us, Dr. F. and her parents
were the only Jewish family in the area and the only Englishspeaking people in the building.

Dr. F. once said, "I

was always considered an adult— and I did not have equivo
cal feelings— I wasn’t a child per se . . ."

In four months

of hospitalization she mentioned only one childhood experi
ence of pleasure: a birthday party when she was eight— but
she was unable to recall the names of any of the playments
she'd invited.

Speaking of her school years, she said,
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"I was a model student."

I know from her cousin that she

worked at after-school jobs from the time she was thirteen
by passing for eighteen; I know too that she was regarded
as odd by schoolmates, even at the special public school
for exceptionally bright children to which she was admitted.
Withdrawn, isolated, and lonely, living with morbid, pre
occupied, psychically scarred parents in a dingy apartment
in a decaying neighborhood; diligent, hard-working and in
telligent, aloof, arrogant, and with touches of grandiosity—
this is the picture of Dr. F.'s childhood I obtained from
her cousin and uncle.

It is the picture of a fragile,

brittle, withdrawn young woman, a young woman described by
her cousin as "a pre-morbid personality, a grandiose per
sonality."
After graduating from her prestigeous high school, Dr.
F. attended a public college and subsequently enrolled in
a local medical school.
her father died.

About the time of her graduation

She said that she had been at his bedside

when he died but had had no special reaction: "He was sim
ply deceased."

She spent an internship year on the West

Coast and it was there that psychological problems seem to
have become manifest.

She referred vaguely to difficulties

working under the supervision of others, but refused to
elaborate.

She returned East for a residency in opthamo-

logy and encountered real difficulty.

She reported that

she got into trouble because she made comments about sexual
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behavior in a discussion with other residents, comments
that were maliciously misinterpreted to her supervisors.
Her cousin told me that she had begun then to hear voices,
that her then-boyfriend had concluded she was too "odd"
and there had been an "acrimonious break."

Shortly there

after Dr. F, left the residency program.
Somewhere in this period Dr. F . ’s mother attempted
suicide by hanging.

Dr. F. said that she had cut her

mother down, but the story is confused.

Dr. F. did obtain

a second year residency at an Ivy League institution and
it was there that the psychosis became virulent.

Dr. F.

claimed that her problems started because "I was too per
fect. . ."

She apparently stood up during lectures to de

nounce people.

He cousin, a resident in the same city at

the time, was called and he reports arriving to find Dr.
F. "on all fours” listening to the sounds from the radia
tor.

She was taken to New York and hospitalized for the

first time.

That summer she traveled to India to seek a

residency, but returned home, unsuccessful, in the fall.
She then went to a western state to seek a residency.

She

was arrested there for theft of service after refusing to
pay a hotel bill.

Her uncle wired money to the hotel and

arranged for transportation back to New York, but Dr. F.
flew instead to a southern city.

There was again trouble

with police, and this time the uncle flew down and took
Dr. F. from what he called "a hang out place," what the
cousin called "a brothel."

There followed a period of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59
hospitalizations and arrests.

Dr. F. declared that it was

in 1975 that her uncle was killed and replaced by a double,
but he reported that she confronted him directly with this
belief only three years later, in 1978, during a long stay
in a state hospital to which she was "abducted."
Just before Dr. F.'s stay in the state hospital her
mother had to be hospitalized again after what the uncle
described as months of refusing to eat, change clothes, or
leave the house.
home.

The mother was discharged to a nursing

While at the state hospital Dr. F. refused to eat

and at one time was tube fed.
she left the hospital.

While out on a "groundspass”

Dr. F. met a man with whom she lived

for five weeks until voices told her that he had been re
placed by a double and she left his apartment.

For several

days, she said, she picked up men on the streets, "indulging
in sodomy for money."

She decided to seek hospitalization

because her voices told her that the "psychologist filmdirectors" were planning to put her into films of sexual
exploitation: there would be "dogs upon my naked person,"
she would be "forced to eat my own excrement," and they
would "insert huge dildoes into my vagina."

She came into

my care, then, to escape the sadistic tortures she antici
pated .
As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Dr. F.
told a story of her mother's "recent death."

I now believe

she told that story to gain admission and thus "safety"
from her persecutors.

In hospital she soon revealed her
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genuine belief which proved resistant to both antipsychotic
medication and to psychotherapy.

Dr. F. informed us early,

"I am not a paranoid schizophrenic with a delusional system,'
adding condescendingly, "It's very complicated, you wouldn't
understand.”

She did enact at least part of what she had

described as her behavior just prior to hospitalization by
suggesting to the Director of In-patient Psychiatry and
later to her social worker that they engage with her in
sodomy.
Dr. F. began to ask for discharge within a week of ad
mission, claiming "all is well.”

When it appeared that

long-term care would be required she began to increase her
participation in ward activities,.asking the dance thera
pist to be sure to note in the chart that she had "partici
pated fully" and telling her nurse "I want you to see that
my personal perimeters are in good order."

She was able,

under the threat of involuntary long-term hospitalization,
to convince the Director that she was aware she had delu
sions and was able to control them, and to tell her thera
pist she understood she had "irrational fears."

Within a

few days of convincing staff that she was able to recog
nize and control the delusion, she horrified a young woman
medical student, who had a noticeable physical handicap
herself, with an account of the tortures she was sure she
would undergo: they were going to "stenose" her intestines,
cut out her eyes, and shove hair brushes into her vagina;
her teeth were to be pulled out without anesthesia, her

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61
legs were to be cut off in slices, and they were going to
create "a huge anal-vaginal fistula;" she would be beaten
with broomsticks, her head would be twisted to the side
and her vertebrae fused, and rubber male genitals would be
surgically attached, making her "appear a hermaphrodite."
The delusion of doubles displayed typical forms remini
scent of Capgras' first patient, as well as some particular
elaborations.

The principal double was that of her mother,

and Dr. F. could give the exact date— July 4, 1974— when
her mother had been "killed.”

That time coincides roughly

with the period of her trip to India, the time also when
she demanded more money for the trip from her mother and
the mother for the first time refused.

Her uncle, she said,

had been killed a year later, at the time when he was in
volved in getting her admitted to the state hospital.

Af

ter some six weeks in hospital she declared that her thera
pist had been replaced by an imposter; shortly thereafter
she declared the social worker a double as well.

Toward

the end of her stay with us, as preparations were begun for
her transfer to a state facility, she asserted that there
were doubles of everyone on the floor, and indeed that there
was an identical, mirror image world on the other side of
our locked doors.
Dr. F. spoke also of doubles of herself.

One double,

who had collected the five hundred million dollars

was on

a "cruise to nowhere" taking Dr. F.'s place, because Dr. F.
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was "channeled for the Presidency." (When questioned some
time later about the significance and responsibility of
the Presidency, Dr. F. said that it was really the VicePresidency for which she was headed— first.)

The second

double of herself, she said, was in other areas of the hos
pital getting Dr. F. into trouble— by indulging in sexual
activity with male staff members and biting their penises
to convince people that Dr. F. was homosexual.

Both of

these doubles were part of the plot of the "film directorpsyehologists" of the original "psychoanalytic study," but
she was the "real" Dr. F. and could prove it by identify
ing people in photographs whom only the real Dr. F. could
have known.

She begged us to contact the President and

the Mayor (and I

believe

she wrote letters to the Presi

dent) but she also said that if we were to let her meet
the Mayor w e ’d probably put in a double of him too.
Dr. F. responded to antipsychotic medication by gaining
more control over the outpour of her delusional system, but
not, it seems, over the delusions themselves.

When she had

convinced staff that she could control her delusions, we
began to plan for discharge. (We had also sought legal
consultation and had been told that we needed to try less
restrictive forms of treatment before considering involun
tary long-term care.)

We were exploring a "half-way house"

for residence and a day-treatment center for out-patient
therapy when, on a day pass she was supposed to use to
attend the day center, Dr. F. was stopped from climbing
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into the East River.

She denied suicidal intent but re

fused to explain the incident other than to say there had
been "a misunderstanding."

She had withdrawn money from

her bank accounts and sent thousands of dollars, unowed,
to the Internal Revenue Service; she had over $9,000 in
cash and bank checks on her person.

Clearly, long-term

care was required, and we began proceedings.

A few days

later, now restricted to our locked ward and on fifteen
minute checks, Dr. F. committed suicide by drowning herself
in the bathtub.
Dr. F.'s delusional system of doubles reflects, I be
lieve, a pathology of internalized object relations which
lay dormant until activated by the onset of her schizo
phrenic illness and which was precipitated by the alterca
tion with her mother over money early in her illness.
Both the evidence I obtained from her uncle and cousin and
the research literature on Holocaust survivors point toward
the kind of mother-child interaction that would lead to
pathological splitting of internalized object representa
tions.

For example, Dr. F.'s uncle told me that her mother

was obsessed by the thought that she had sacrificed her
son in order to save her own life.

As has already been

mentioned, Holocaust survivors who lost children seem to
have been especially beset by guilt.

We know that Mrs. F.

was morbid and brooding, dispirited, a shadow of the active,
effective professional she had been before the war.

It
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seems reasonable to suppose that she, like so many sur
vivor mothers, was emotionally unavailable, anxious, watch
ful, and mistrustful.

I can hypothesize that the earliest,

split internalized object representations were never inte
grated, and the split-off "bad" mother images lay dormant
in the unconscious while an idealized "good" mother image
was tenaciously maintained.

Dr. F. always described her

parents in a totally positive light: her parents were per
fectly good, there were never any family problems, she had
an ideal childhood.
Her illness seems to have begun during her internship
year— at the time, significantly, of her first separation
from home.

The delusion of doubles came, she indicated,

about two years later— at least she dated her mother's
"death" at that time.

The precipitating event seems to

have been an argument over money as Dr. F. erratically
sought residency programs.
mother, the mother refused.

Dr. F. demanded money from her
Dr. F. struck her mother

during this argument; indeed, it was a discussion of this
incident which first uncovered the delusion of doubles.
When asked, early in her hospitalization, if she had ever
been angry at her mother, she replied, "Yes."

Did they

ever fight? "No comment ...yes...the real E.F. hit her
mother, not this one. . .no, it was the false E.F. who hit
her mother, not me. . .1 sound like a paranoid schizophrenic
with a split personality, but I'm not."

A day later she

said, "E.F. is not proud of hitting her mother," and added
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later, "The false E.F. hit her mother.
struck an imposter mother.”

. .the true E.F.

The altercation, I believe,

stimulated an upsurge of rage at the mother, rage which
elicited the previously unconscious, aggressively charged
"bad" mother images.

At the same time there occurred a

marked affective shift in which Dr. F. wondered, shocked,
that her mother had refused her

"My mother wouldn’t

refuse me, how can this be happening?"

The affective

strangeness combined with the unfamiliar rage and its concommitant anxiety, guilt, and fear and with the formerly
dissociated "bad" mother image produced first a feeling
that "this can’t be my mother," then the delusion that
there was an imposter mother, a malevolent, frustrating
person who rightly warranted the anger.

Once the delusion

of the first double was accepted, other important people,
especially as they too frustrated Dr. F., would "logically"
become part of the system.

Dr. F.'s uncle, for example,

was told he was a double at the time he was arranging Dr.
F . ’s commitment to a state hospital.

The man with whom Dr.

F. lived for several weeks after leaving the state hospital
became a double only when he began worrying about her and
attempted to contact her family.

The belief that her thera

pist had a double developed only after discussions began
about long-term care, and the social worker was replaced
only when he refused to facilitate her effort to obtain
a new Social Security number under a false name.

The para
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broad plot, but only the pathological process of splitting
of representations adequately describes the allegations
of replacement by doubles.
Doubles of the self seem less common in Capgras' Syn
drome than doubles of others (although Capgras' first
patient believed there were doubles of herself,as did the
patient of Dupouy and Montassut).

I have noted eight cases

in the English reports (see Appendix) in which the delusion
included doubles of the self.

Again, an object relations

perspective may serve to help us understand that phenomenon.
Just as internalized images of the mother were split, so
too were self-images.

The narcissistic, idealized self-

images— the "model student," the "too perfect" resident—
were consciously held and fiercely maintained.

(Dr. F.'s

cousin said she had as a young woman always been "aloof"
and "grandiose;" she could, even when I knew her, be re
markably condescending.)

As illness took hold and she

felt herself changing, and as she encountered rejection
in her search for a residency, she protected that idealized
image by asserting the existence of doubles.

The second

double, the imposter she believed was sexually active in
the hospital in order to get her into trouble, represented
projected aspects of the "bad" self-representations which
had originally been split and repressed but which returned
to consciousness in the course of the schizophrenic illness.
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Conscious but unacceptable, those "bad" attributes could
be externalized and disavowed in the form of a second
double, the imposter biting penises.
An additional dimension in the "choice” of the delusion
of doubles may have come from the family tragedy: Dr. F.'s
brother was "dead" but probably alive, somewhere in Eastern
Europe, unaware himself of his true identity; and Dr. F.'s
father had been declared "dead” in order to return him to
life with his wife.

Dr. F. was aware of the family story,

although she professed little interest in her parents'
suffering.

I wonder too whether some of her fantasies of

torture she expected to undergo were derived from Nazi
"medical experiments" about which she may have known. (See
Trials of War Criminals. . . , 1946-1949.) Indeed, when I
expressed some sympathy for her parents, Dr. F. replied,
"It’s what happened to them, not to me— for me it ’s much
worse: no one has ever undergone such torture as I will
undergo.”

It may have been fear of those tortures, which

she expected to occur should she be sent to a state hospital,
which drove her to take her own life.
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IV
The Delusion of Doubles
in Broader Context

The delusion of doubles is frightening, yet familiar.
It is alien and horrifying, yet we somehow recognize its
closeness to ourselves.

It is uncanny.

"The uncanny,"

wrote Freud (1919), "is that class of the terrifying which
leads back to something long known to us, once very fami
liar ."(p. 369)

To understand the delusion of doubles ade

quately, we must acknowledge its familiar as well as its
frightening aspects; we must seek to set the delusion into
the context of normal and neurotic phenomena, as well as
to describe it in its psychotic extreme.

We must search,

then, for phenomena in the broad range of human experience
which can offer fuller understanding of the origins of the
ideas of doubles and the expression of those ideas in normal
life, in neurotic distress, and in the creativity of fiction
as well.

Only such a contextual effort can provide the

necessary beginning for the understanding of the phenomenon
and for psychotherapeutic treatment of its devastating
pathological form.
There must be both intra-psychic experiences and en
vironmental-experiential factors to give shape to the idea
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of doubles.

The object-relations theory approach I have

suggested may provide the necessary intra-psychic patterns
for the delusion of doubles.

There are patterns as well

in normal human interactions and experiences.

The obvious

experiential templates for the delusion of doubles are twins,
family resemblances, chance similarities in appearance,
and shadows and reflections.

Crawley (1914) discusses the

importance in many primitive cultures of shadows and re
flections as images of the soul, and of the belief in an
cient Egypt and elsewhere that the soul is an identical
image of the body, released at death or, in some cultures,
at sleep.

To cast no shadow or no

reflection would be

to be soul-less. (In the film "Dracula," van Helsing con
firms his belief that the count is a vampire by noting his
lack of reflection in a mirror.)

Identical twins are start

ling, and there are often "look-alike" contests seeking
doubles of prominent figures in politics or entertainment.
Ordinary language hints at a familiar toying with
questions of identity and identical images.

We say, "I

am not myself today," or "He was beside himself."

When

startled by an uncharacteristic act by a well-known person
we may ask, incredulously, "How could he, of all people,
do something like that?," and we might even add, "It can’t
be he!"

We speak of people putting up a "false front”

and often say of others (or feel of ourselves) that it is
possible to live a "double life."

Capgras, Lucchini, and

Schiff (1925) asked, "Who among us has not happened to
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encounter a friend having changed in some commonplace way
the habitual aspect of his appearance and said to ourself
'This is not he, as I know him, but someone who resembles
him greatly. . .'?"(p.214)

Indeed, some of us may have

acted in our lives much like Doestoevsky's Golyadkin in
The Double (1866).

Golyadkin, riding in a rented carriage,

a mode of transportation far above his station as a clerk,
passes his department head, also, but appropriately in his
case, in a carriage.
Seeing that concealment was quite out of the question
since Andrey Filippovich, having recognized him, was
now staring hard at him, his eyes nearly popping out
of his head, Mr. Golyadkin coloured up to his ears.
"Shall I bow? Shall I make some response? Shall
I admit it's me, or shan't I?" thought our hero in
indescribable anguish. "Or shall I pretend it's not
me, but someone extraordinarily like me, and just
look as if nothing had happened? It really isn't me,
it isn't me, and that's all there is to it," said
Mr. Golyadkin, raising his hat to Andrey Filippovich
and not taking his eyes off him. (p.IS)
Experiences such as that of Golyadkin seem quite familiar
and understandable, for who has not wished at some time or
other to be recognized not as himself but to be taken only
as someone looking very much the same?
There is an extensive literature on the concept of the
double in fiction. (See Guerard, 1967; Rogers, 1970; Rosenfield, 1963; and

Tym m s,

1949, for example.)

Literary cri

ticism uses the term "double" with a far broader defini
tion that I would suggest is useful.

The double, for the

literary critics, includes the autoscopic image, the iden
tical look-alike, and a wide range of non-similar charac
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ters who can be seen as foils to the protagonist, repre
senting hidden dimensions of his personality or projected
fragments of his shattered psyche.

Critics like Rogers

(1970), for example, tend to see most conflict as intra
psychic, with various characters representing ego, id, and
superego and with Oedipal dramas as the heart of literary
imagination.

It is important to bear in mind this wide

definition of doubles when considering the possible con
tributions of fiction to our understanding of Capgras* Syn
drome, for while literary usage does illuminate the delu
sion of doubles, it is not directly analogous.
Rosenfield (1963) notes that from the Classical world
through the Renaissance doubles were used as either divert
ing look-alikes in comedy or as instructional, allegorical
opposities in morality plays.

The Romantics, she notes,

used doubles in fairy tales, but only moderns deliberately
use the structure of the double to portray ". . .the con
flict between the conscious and the unconscious life, the
constant menace of personal disintegration which apparently
threatens us all, and the loss of identity consequent both
upon mental disorder and the necessity that the character
mask his internal life by creating roles to play."(p.343)
Perhaps the most famous use of doubles in Classical
literature occurs in Amphitryon, by Plautus (ca.200B.C.)
In the prologue Mercury tells the essentials of the play,
and the outline of the original Greek myth.
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He /Jove/ began carrying on an affair with Alcmena
behind her husband’s /Amphitryon’s/ back. He borrowed
her husband’s looks for_himself, made love to her,
and made her pregnant /with Hercules/ on his own. I
want you to get Alcmena's situation straight: she’s
pregnant by both of them, by her husband and by al
mighty Jove. . . .I’ve changed myself to look like
Sosia, Amphitryon's servant, who's off at the front
with his master, (p.5)
The action of the play takes off as the real Amphitryon
returns home from war with his real servant, Sosia.

Mari

tal strife and the multiple beatings of Sosia provide the
occasion for comedy.

At one point Sosia, desperate but con

vinced that there are two of him, insists to Amphitryon,
"I tell you I'm in that house over there and also beside
you here."(p.31)

A happy ending is achieved when Jove re

veals his adventures to Amphitryon and all the mortal be
ings are reconciled.
Shakespeare's A Comedy of Errors (1593?) also uses
the device of doubles to achieve comedic effects.

Again

both masters and servants are doubled, in this case by two
serts of identical twins, separated in infancy and brought
together, unknowingly, in maturity.

Wives and servants,

friends and creditors are confused, servants are beaten,
and devoted wives are maligned and disheartened until, at
last, the two sets of twins are finally brought together
at the end of the play.

Confronted with two sets of con

fusing identical twins put before him, the Dpke of Ephesus
asks:
One of these men is genius to the other;
And so of these. Which is the natural man,
And which the spirit? Who deciphers them?
(Act V, scene i)
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All is explained, and all forgiven, as reunited families
recognize their kinship, and fears of enchantment, of
magical bewitching, vanish as the natural twinship is re
vealed.
As Plautus toys with divine dissemblance and Shake
speare employs twins, other authors utilize other forms of
doubling in their works.

I will discuss briefly several

of the works which seem most useful in thinking about the
delusion of doubles.

Andersen's fairy tale "The Shadow"

(1835?/1936) uses the notion of the shadow as double and
also introduces the theme of the double taking over the
original.

In Andersen’s story a student from a cold

northern country visits a hotter southern country.

A

vision of a beautiful maiden on the balcony across the
street prompts the student to send his shadow into her
dwelling— and the shadow does not return.

The student

"returned to his cold fatherland and he wrote books about
all that was true, and good, and beautiful in the world,"
(p.341) but one day he was visited by his shadow, a shadow
grown solid, knowing, and powerful. The student asked the
shadow where he had been and what he had learned.
'I saw the most incredible, unheard-of things among
all ranks and classes.
I saw,' continued the shadow
emphatically, ’what none must know, but all would
so much like to know— their neighbors* secret evil
deeds.’(p.345)
The now rich shadow convinces the student to act as his
shadow, indeed shows off his intelligent "shadow" as a
way to win favor with the rich and the aristocratic.
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When the shadow has won the hand of a princess, the
scholar tries to stop the deceit, but the shadow, de
claring "My shadow has become crazy,"(p.350) has the
scholar imprisoned and killed.
Two stories by Guy de Maupassant describe phenomena
related to the sense of being taken over by a "double."
In "The Horla,"(1880s/1923) the narrator wonders if there
are two beings dwelling within him and declares, "Some
body possesses my soul and governs it.

Somebody orders

all my acts, all my movements, all my thoughts."(p.249)
Determined to destroy the evil presence, the narrator
burns down his house, then realizes that the presence is
still with him— to destroy it he must kill himself.

In

"He"(1880s/1923) the narrator decides he must marry, not
because he is in love but because he is frightened of being
alone. ". . .I am afraid of myself, afraid of that horrible
sensation of incomprehensible fear. . .Above all, I am
afraid of my own dreadful thoughts, of my reason, which
seems as if it were about to leave me, driven away by a
mysterious and invisible agony."(p.154)

The

narrator wan

ders in the streets to escape his terrifying aloneness,
and on entering his apartment notices a figure sitting in
his chair— but he touches the figure, and no one is there.
Maupassant himself apparently experienced autoscopic pheno
mena (see Todd and Dewhurst,1955), and the narrator of this
story becomes obsessed with the idea of seeing "him"(self)
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again, obsessed to the point of being convinced that if
he were to marry this other self would not reappear.
The idea of a "double," dangerous and different from
the surface, social self, takes poignant form in Stevenson’s
"Dr.

Jekyll and Mr. Hyde" (1886/1879).

The inner, hidden

demonic persona of Mr. Hyde exerts an irresistible pres
sure to emerge, and in emerging overwhelms the civilized
Dr.

Jekyll. "All things therefore seemed to point to this:

that I was slowly losing hold of my original and better
self, and becoming slowly incorporated with my second and
worse."(p.89)

In the chapter entitled "Henry

Jekyll's

Full Statement of the Case," Stevenson has Dr.

Jekyll re

veal the history of his disastrous experiment.

The por

trait of a soul divided is apt and moving.
I was born in the year 18__ to a large fortune, en
dowed besides with excellent parts, inclined by nature
to industry, fond of the respect of the wise and good
among my fellow-men, and thus, as might have been sup
posed, with every guarantee of an honorable and dis
tinguished future. And indeed, the worst of my faults
was a certain impatient gaiety of disposition, such
as has made the happiness of many, but such as I found
it hard to reconcile with my imperious desire to carry
my head high, and wear a more than commonly grave coun
tenance before the public. Hence it came about that
I concealed my pleasures; and that when I reached years
of reflection, and began to look round me and take
stock of my progress and position in the world, I
stood already committed to a profound duplicity of
life. Many a man would have even blazoned such irre
gularities as I was guilty of; but from the high views
that I had set before me, I regarded and hid them with
an almost morbid sense of shame. It was thus rather
the exacting nature of my aspirations, than any par
ticular degradation in my faults, that made me what I
was and, with even a deeper trench than in the majority
of men, severed in me those provinces of good and ill
which divide and compound m a n ’s dual nature. In this
case, I was driven to reflect deeply and inveterately
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on that hard law of life which lies at the root of
religion, and is one of the most plentiful springs
of distress. Though so profound a double-dealer, I
was in no sense a hypocrite: both sides of me were in
dead earnest; I was no more myself when I laid aside
restraint and plunged in shame, than when I labored,
in the eye of day, at the furtherance of knowledge or
the relief of sorrow and suffering.(p.81)
Dr. Jekyll struggled, then, not to repress one or the
other aspect of himself, but rather to separate the two,
so that each part might pursue its own natural inclinations.
We feel, with Jekyll, the torment of his divided self, for
we can easily recognize in ourselves the conflicts of im
pulse and prohibition.
Poe's short story "William Wilson"(1839/1950) presents
one of the few literary accounts of an identical double
of the self, and thus a clearer analogue to one form of
Capgras’ Syndrome.

Poe ’s narrator opens with mention of

his "later years of unspeakable misery and unpardonable
crime,"(p.39) thus setting a contemporary frame around in
cidents from his past.

As a child, says the narrator, he

was "self-willed, addicted to the wildest caprices, and
a prey to the most ungovernable passions."(p.40)

To his

school came a new boy, a boy who shared his rather common
name.

The namesake provokes anxiety in the narrator, but

his feelings are mixed.
They formed a motley and heterogeneous admixture—
some petulant animosity, which was not yet hatred,
some esteem, more respect, much fear, with a world
of uneasy curiosity. To the moralist it will be un
necessary to say, in addition, that Wilson and my
self were the most inseparable of companions.(p.45)
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The namesake imitates

the narrator in dress, gesture,

voice, and manner andtakes on a patronizing role,
role of the giver of moral advice.

the

The moral interference

of the double continues at Eton, when the narrator is
drunk and carousing but the double appears and produces
instant sobriety.

Again, at Oxford, as the narrator is

cheating at cards the
posed.

double appears and the fraud

Forced to leave Oxford, the narrator

isex

flees tothe

Continent, but at each moment of crime or debauchery the
double appears ". . .to frustrate those actions which, if
fully carried out, might have resulted in bitter mischief."
(p.57)

Indeed, the narrator, while frustrated, nonetheless

feels "deep awe" as he regards "the majestic wisdom, the
apparent omnipresence and omnipotence of Wilson.

. ."(p.58)

At last, in Rome, as the double frustrates a seduction,
the narrator is driven to a final rage and, drawing his
sword, runs the double through.

He then beholds

mine own image, but with features all pale and dab
bled in blood. ..It was Wilson; but he spoke no long
er in a whisper, and I could have fancied that I my
self was speaking when he said:"You have conquered,
and I yield. Yet, hence forward art thou also dead—
dead tothe World, to Heaven, and to Hope! In me didst
thou exist— and, in my death, see by
this image, which
is thine own, how utterly thou hast murdered thyself!"
( P . 60)
In the killing of the double, of the moral self, all hope
dies.

The double’s last words return the reader to the

narrator’s opening lines:
Oh outcast of all outcasts most abandoned!— to the
earth art thou not forever dead? to its honors,
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to its flowers, to its golden aspirations?— and
a cloud, dense, dismal, and limitless, does it not
hang eternally between thy hopes and heaven?(p.39)
For the narrator Wilson, as for Dr. Jekyll, all hope fades
when the self-observing moral agency succumbs to the un
bridled passions.
Poe makes two observations which are striking in the
context of Capgras’ Syndrome.

First, he shows how the mo

ral, self-observing agency, the superego, is both admired
and resented, and how the "good" and "bad" in conflict can
become unstuck. Once "inseparable companions," the narrator
and the double become increasingly dissociated.

But per

haps these aspects of the self were never fully bound in
William Wilson, and this is the second point to note.

The

narrator recalls an altercation with his double at school
and remembers:
. . .1 discovered, or fancied I discovered, in his
accent, in his air, and general appearance, a some
thing which first startled, then deeply interested
me, by bringing to mind dim visions of my earliest
infancy— wild, confused and thronging memories of
a time when memory herself was yet unborn. I cannot
better describe the sensation which oppressed me than
by saying that I could with difficulty shake off the
belief of my having been acquainted with the being who
stood before me, at some epoch very long ago— some
point of the past infintely remote.(p.49)
Poe seems to allude here to an obscure awareness of the
tumultuous images of split good and bad self-representations,
images of warring affect, recognizable but irreconcilable;
images split and dissociated, images never cohering and
thus always susceptible to fragmenting.
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If Poe delineates an ultimate dissolution of poorly
integrated self-representations, Joseph Conrad, in "The
Secret Sharer”(caI902/1981) presents a study of reintegra
tion of dissociated aspects of the self.

Conrad's narra

tor takes his first command of a sailing ship, feeling
some prescient intimation of an arduous enterprise to come.
"But what I felt most,” he says, "was my being a stranger
to the ship; and if the truth must be told, I was somewhat
of a stranger to myself."(p.138)

New to the position of

command, new to the ship, the narrator is as unknown to
his crew as they to him.

"They /the crew/ had simply to

be equal to their tasks; but I wondered how far I should
turn out faithful to that ideal conception of one's own
personality every man sets up for himself secretly."(p.138)
Ruminating on deck in the stillness of the tropical air,
the captain reveals a bit of how he happened— how he chose?—
to become a stranger to himself.
And suddenly I rejoiced in the great security of the
sea as compared with the unrest of the land, in my
choice of that untempted life presenting no disquieting
problems, invested with an elementary moral beauty by
the absolute straightforwardness of its appeal and by
the singleness of its purpose.(p.141)
In his first act as captain, the narrator takes a watch on
deck— then worries what effect his untraditional behavior
will have on his crew.

And then the security and elemen

tary moral beauty of the sea are broken.
The captain spots Leggatt floating naked by the side
of the ship, speaks to him, and brings him secretly aboard.
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The captain notes a subtle change in himself, a change
somehow stimulated by the words of Leggatt: "The voice was
calm and resolute.

A good voice.

The self-possession of

that man had somehow induced a corresponding state in my
self, (p. 144)

The captain frequently notes that he and Leg

gatt do not look alike, yet just as frequently, and often
in the same sentence, calls Leggatt his "double" or his
"other self."

Leggatt has escaped from imprisonment on his

own ship: he had, in a fit of temper, killed a man who was
endangering the entire ship.

The murder was not intended,

the victim was a worthless, surly fellow, but a crime was
done; Leggatt, imprisoned, chose escape over trial.

For

the irresolute captain listening to the determined Leggatt,
"It was, in the night, as though I had been faced by my
own reflection in the depths of a somber and immense mir
ror, "(p. 146)

The captain hides Leggatt in his cabin,

clothes him, feeds him— and by his unusual behavior further
strains relations with his crew.

To give Leggatt the best

chance to escape the captain brings his ship dangerously
close to an island shore; now resolute himself, he holds
his course, leaves Leggatt to his freedom and his fate,
and catches at last the off-shore wind that moves his ship
to safety.

For Conrad's captain, Leggatt, the secret shar

er, represents the untested, dissociated aspects of himself.
In the crisis of hiding a wanted criminal the captain sees
dimensions of himself in the other and allows those hidden
parts to rejoin the functioning self.
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Doestoevsky’s short novel The Double (1866/1958) pre
sents the story of a petty clerk tormented by his double.
At the beginning of the story it is clear that Golyadkin
is in the process of psychotic decompensation.

He spends

inordinate time in narcissistic preoccupation before the
mirror, suffers from vague paranoid delusions and ideas of
reference, endures periods of agitation, and acts inappro
priately.

Like William Wilson, Golyadkin initially feels

warmly toward his double: "Mr. Golyadkin felt no hatred,
enmity or even the slightest unfriendliness towards him—
quite the reverse, it would seem."(p.79)

The double works

in the same office, gradually usurping Golyadkin’s position,
turning colleagues against him, and causing mischief and
ridicule.

Golyadkin questions the reality of the double,

even sees his doctor, but his illness grows and his frantic
efforts to assert himself bring even more disastrous re
sponses.

Eventually he is carried away to an asylum at

the direction of his doctor: "This wasn't Dr. Rutenspitz!
Who was it?

Or was it him? It was! Not the earlier Dr.

Rutenspitz, but another, a terrible Dr. Rutenspitz!"(p.254)
Perhaps Golyadkin displays here the process of generaliza
tion of the delusion of doubles noted in several case re
ports mentioned above, as the belief in one persecuting
double expands to include belief that others too have been
impersonated.

The double here represents what Golyadkin

wishes he himself were like: the double is younger, more
charming, more socially adroit and socially accepted.
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The double while imbued with "good" attributes nonethe less foils the original, as do nearly all doubles
reported in the clinical literature.
Doubles in literature seem then to appear in a num
ber of forms: the felt but unseen "possessor;" the seen
identical image; the seen but distinctly differentappearing image representing a divided aspect of the self.
Each of these works is the story of a double of a self,
not a story of doubles of others. (There are also, of
course, stories of identical twins, known and unknown to
each other, who represent good and evil; there are
"science fiction" stories of duplication, like "Invasion
of the Body Snatchers," but these latter seem usually of
a "lower order" of literary endeavor, romances, adventures,
or thrillers.)

The general pattern in these works of

fiction emphasizes the "trench" in Jekyll’s words, cited
above, which severs "those provinces of good and ill which
divide and compound man's dual nature."

The double seems

usually to possess some dissociated, split-off aspects of
the self, aspects often charged with unbridled passion, as
with Jekyll or Andersen's scholar, though at times repre
senting acceptable characteristics (Leggatt) or conscience
(William Wilson).

The double is usually capable of obser

ving the original, of knowing all about him, and of judging
him.

Often then, the double seems to represent some notion

of a superego, either in its critically judgmental aspect
of conscience (William Wilson) or, less frequently, in its
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more benevolent aspect as ego ideal (Leggatt).
I have tried to indicate the every-day ways (twins,
reflections, etc.) in which the idea of doubles can become
the theme of delusion and I have tried to present some of
the expressions of that idea in works of fiction.

But it

is not only in delusion or fiction that the idea of doubles
becomes lively, it is also in moments of our ordinary
growth and development.

I would like to present three

sketches of Capgras-like phenomena in non-psychotic child
ren to indicate something of the place of the idea of
doubles in development.

Two cases are of people I have

encountered; one is discussed by Bruno Bettelheim.
Bettelheim, in his The Uses of Enchantment (1976),
discusses the echoes in fairy tales of the splitting of
object representations.

When kind grandmother suddenly

reprimands and humiliates the child for bedwetting, for
example,
To the child, Grandma is no longer the same person
she was a moment before; she has become an ogre. . .
Unable to see any congruence between the different
manifestations, the child truly experiences Grandma
as two separate entities— the loving and the threat
ening. She is indeed grandma and the wolf. By
dividing her up, so to speak, the child can preserve
his image of the good grandmother, (pp.66,67)
Splitting of one person into two in order to keep the good
image uncontaminated is a device not only of fairy tales,
but also of many children confronted with "a relationship
too difficult to manage or comprehend."(p.67)

Bettelheim

tells of a college student who remembered an experience
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she had when aged five.
One day in a supermarket this girl's mother suddenly
became very angry with her, and the girl felt utterly
devastated that her mother could act this way toward
her. On the walk home, her mother continued to scold
her angrily, telling her she was no good. The girl
became convinced that this vicious person only looked
like her mother and, although pretending to be her,
was actually an evil Martian, a look-alike impostor,
who had taken away her mother and assumed her appear
ance. From then on, the girl assumed on many different
occasions that this Martian had abducted her mother
and taken her place to torture the child as the real
mother would never have done.
This fantasy went on for a couple of years until,
when seven, the girl became courageous enough to try
to set traps for the Martian. When the Martian had
once again taken Mother's place to engage in its ne
farious practice of torturing her, the girl would
cleverly put some question to the Martian about what
had happened between the real mother and herself. To
her amazement, the Martian knew all about it, which at
first just confirmed the Martian's cunning to the girl.
But after two or three such experiments the girl be
came doubtful; then she asked her mother about events
which had taken place between the girl and the Martian.
When it became obvious that her mother knew about
these events, the fantasy of the Martian collapsed.(p.67)
Bettelheim concludes that at the time this girl needed to
feel secure that her mother was totally good and thus in
capable of inflicting such painful criticism, she was able
to rearrange reality via the delusion of the Martian and
so preserve her belief in her mother's total goodness.
When more secure in herself she was able to test the fan
tasy and integrate the double image of her mother.
A similar quality of thought appeared in a three year
old boy whom I met last summer.

Just before I met him, his

parents told me, he had begun to say things like "I don't
want two daddies, a nice daddy and a nasty daddy."

He seemed

also to be having nightmares of "two daddies." (It should
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not be difficult to imagine the enthusiasm with which I
responded to this encounter.)

The boy offered little ad

ditional data; he was very bright, but late in language
acquisition.

His vocabulary was limited and he was reluc

tant to talk about these unsettling experiences.

I did

discover, however, that a few days before he first complained
of two daddies his father had, for this first time, in
flicted a corporal punishment, and the father acknowledged
he had been in a towering rage at the child.
to Bettelheim's girl is obvious.

The parallel

In both cases a sudden

change of attitude on the part of a parent is so shocking,
so alien, that it threatens the child’s entire world view
and can "only" be explained by the "fact" that two persons,
not one, are involved.
The second Capgras-like case I encountered was reported
by a 24 year old college student who spontaneously recalled
while in treatment that when he was about five he had begun
to believe that his mother was occasionally replaced by an
identical double.

His conviction, he

recalled, was com

plete: on many occasions, roughly between his fifth and
tenth years, his mother would leave home and an identical
double would return.

He knew it was a double because,

even though identical, she felt different to him: she was
hard, cold, angry; she treated him differently.

Looking

back, the young man realized that the delusion began short
ly after his parents' divorce and occurred always after
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what must have been his mother’s going out on dates which
went badly.
clear.

Again the parallel with Bettelheim's case is

At a time when this boy especially needed the com

plete support and security of a loving mother, her strained
and changed demeanor could not be tolerated because of the
risk it posed to his good image of her.

The unpleasant

mother, then, was believed to be a double, an impostor, a
person who did not love him and whom, in turn, he could
reject without losing his inner bond to his "real," loving
mother.
The argument I have presented in this chapter tries to
indicate that the Capgras’ Syndrome, the psychotic delusion
of doubles, should appear not as a bizarre, exotic, alien
entity, but rather as the extreme expression of phenomena
familiar to us all.

In our development as a species as well

as our development as individuals we note the striking pos
sibility of similarity in twins, reflections, and chance
resemblances.

Our literature is rich with the idea of

doubles as comedic devices and allegorical reminders as
well as in depictions of our potential for psychic dissolu
tion and our capacity for doing ill as well as good.

Our

fairy tales enact the splitting up of good and bad, and echo
the normal childhood devices of preserving good images by
postulating bad impostors. (Folklore is rich with stories
of "changelings," and as late as the early twentieth cen
tury there are accounts of children left to die on dungheaps because their parents believed they were changelings.
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/Briggs, 1967/)

The "family romance" of the neurotic

(Freud, 1909) portrays, according to both Bettelheim (1976)
and Fenichel (1945) a similar if somewhat less dramatically
conceived role. Rank (1909) notes also the presence of the
family romance in myths of the birth of the hero.

Freud

(1909) compares the "family romance" to historical intrigues;
indeed, in 1688 the birth of a potential Catholic successor
to the throne of England brought with it a wide-spredd be
lief that the infant was "supposititious,” a changeling
in the royal family. (See Berson, 1968)

Folklore and his

tory, then, echo literature and psychoanalytic theory.
The three cases sketches I have presented in this context
should, I hope, convey in yet another way the familiarity
with which we ought to greet the notion of doubles.
Perhaps a more familiar response to Dr. F.'s delusion
of doubles would have made possible some real treatment.
It is hard to know.

Certainly by the time I met her, her

disease had taken a heavy toll, the delusion of doubles
and the fear of mutilating torture preoccupied her totally.
Earlier, perhaps, some recognition of the syndrome, some
sense of its relation to us all, might have fostered better
care.

It is my hope that this discussion of the delusion

of doubles may help engender a better response to those
who suffer it.

Those authors who posit potential organic

causes for the syndrome urge greater diligence in organic
work-ups.

I would urge as well greater attention to early

object relations, to one-sided images of self and others,
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and to interpersonal experiences of sudden, startling
changes in emotionally rich relationships.

If the idea

of doubles is, as I have tried to demonstrate, a more
familiar, understandable phenomenon than we had thought,
it is nonetheless most horrifying, cruel, and awful when
it takes psychotic form.

What is richness in literary

metaphor, what is transitionally adaptive in childhood
dilemmas, what brings mirthful confusion in drama or twinplay, is also capable of wreaking devastation and tragic
destruction as Capgras' Syndrome, the delusion of doubles.
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Appendix

Cases of Capgras’ Syndrome
Reported in English
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